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I. INTRODUCTION
Reform of the Hatch-Waxman generic drug framework is in the air.
Changes in how the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implements
the law, as well as changes to the law itself, are under serious consideration.
These policymaking discussions are taking place against a backdrop of
shared assumptions about the origins and nature of the original HatchWaxman legislation—assumptions that this Article claims are wrong.
The Hatch-Waxman statute, enacted more than thirty years ago and
modestly revised fifteen years ago, authorized the FDA to approve generic
drugs based on “abbreviated” marketing applications.1 These applications
1
See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585; Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
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do not contain safety and effectiveness data; instead they rely on data
submitted by the companies whose drugs they copy.2 Congress also created
an exemption from patent infringement so that generic firms could make and
test their drugs during the terms of patents covering the original drugs.3 The
scheme provided drug patent owners with an extension of their patents (one
per drug)—also known as “patent term restoration”—to make up for time
spent generating safety and effectiveness data before approval.4 It also
promised them a window of time before generic applications could be
submitted (or approved, depending on the provision).5 And it created a
mechanism for generic firms and innovators to resolve patent infringement
issues before generic drug launch.6
Many scholars urge reform on the ground that drug innovators “abuse”
the scheme to enjoy more time on the market without generic competition.
Professors Lemley, Dogan, and Carrier argue, for instance, that innovators
introduce new versions of their products in a way that enables them to enjoy,
inappropriately, a longer period before generic drug launch than they would
otherwise enjoy.7 Professors Carrier, Paradise, and Kesselheim argue that
innovators improperly decline to share samples of their patented products
with generic firms that seek to use the abbreviated pathway.8 Professor
Feldman argues that innovators take advantage of the Hatch-Waxman
requirement that generic drugs have the same labeling as the drugs they copy,
to prevent approval of generic drugs for longer than appropriate. 9 Some
scholars, like Professor Shepherd, defend the status quo in the face of these
arguments.10 Others urge policy reform on the ground that the scheme
provides inadequate incentives for innovation. Professor Goldman and
colleagues suggest, for example, that Congress should amend the statute to

2

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2018).
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2018).
4
35 U.S.C. § 156 .
5
E.g., § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
6
§§ 355(b)(2)(j), 271(e)(2).
7
Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (2016); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and
Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009).
8
Michael A. Carrier & Brenna Sooy, Five Solutions to the REMS Patent Problem, 97
B.U. L. REV. 1661 (2017); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns
30: Do We Need a Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 293, 320–22 (2015); Jordan Paradise, REMS as a Competitive Tactic: Is Big
Pharma Hijacking Drug Access and Patient Safety?, 15 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 43
(2015).
9
Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic
Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 506 (2016).
10
Joanna Shepherd, Deterring Innovation: NY v. Actavis and the Duty to Subsidize
Competitors’ Market Entry, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 663, 664 (2016).
3
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provide innovators with a longer respite before generic approval.11
Professors Budish, Roin, and Williams suggest that the patent extension does
not go far enough and that drug patent terms should begin with
commercialization.12
Interest in reform is intensifying. In 2017, the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs convened a public hearing and opened a docket for comment on
the Hatch-Waxman scheme.13 Most of the comments call for changes at the
FDA, and many call for legislative change.14 Also in 2017, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) convened a workshop relating to generic drug
competition and solicited responses to a series of questions, many of which
related to legislative changes.15 Congressional committees have held
hearings in recent years,16 and members have introduced bills to amend the
scheme.17 The innovating and generic drug industries have been vocal about
change, along with third parties such as the American Medical Association
(AMA).18
This policy discussion takes place within the context of a well-accepted
narrative about the political history of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and
the nature of the resulting legislation. Conventional wisdom holds that the
legislation represented a compromise between the competing interests of the
generic drug companies and the innovating drug companies.19 Some
characterize the compromise as privately negotiated between the two
11
Dana P. Goldman et al., The Benefits from Giving Makers of Conventional ‘Small
Molecule’ Drugs Longer Exclusivity Over Clinical Trial Data, 30 HEALTH AFF. 84, 84 (2011),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2009.1056.
12
Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from
Cancer Clinical Trials (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19430, 2013),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19430.pdf.
13
Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 82 Fed. Reg. 43767-01 (Sept. 19,
2017).
14
See generally Comments to Docket No. FDA-2017-N-3615.
15
Understanding Competition in Prescription Drug Markets: Entry and Supply Chain
Dynamics, FTC (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2017/11/
understanding-competition-prescription-drug-markets-entry-supply.
16
See generally, e.g., The Cost of Prescription Drugs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 115th Cong. (2017); Antitrust Concerns and the FDA
Approval Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial, and
Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017).
17
E.g., S. 124, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 2051, 115th Cong. (2017).
18
See generally Comments to Docket No. FDA-2017-N-3615.
19
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Daniel A. Crane, Patent Punting: How FDA and Antitrust
Courts Undermine the Hatch-Waxman Act to Avoid Dealing with Patents, 21 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197, 244 (2015) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act is a complex
compromise between the interests of innovators and generics . . . .”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 727 (2005) (describing
the Hatch-Waxman Act as a “complex legislative compromise between the interests of
research pharmaceutical firms and generic competitors”).
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industries.20 Courts, too, accept this conventional wisdom. Many refer to a
balance between competing policy goals, but they generally associate these
goals with the interests of the respective industries, and some imply a private
agreement.21 Key to this narrative, though, is the notion that both sides won
and both sides lost. The generic firms are said to have received a safe harbor
from infringement liability for generic drug development as well as the right
to rely on innovator testing data.22 The innovating firms are said to have
received additional protection in the market: a patent extension and data
exclusivity.23
20

E.g., Dan L. Burk, Means and Meaning in Patent Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE
ALSO 13, 22 (2013) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act is a complicated series of legislative
compromises between original pharmaceutical developers and generic manufacturers.”);
Anna B. Laakmann, The Hatch-Waxman Act’s Side Effects: Precautions for Biosimilars, 47
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 917, 919 (2014) (writing that the scheme “structured a compromise
between brand name and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers”); Rachel Sachs, The New
Model of Interest Group Representation in Patent Law, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 344, 383 (2014)
(writing that the statute was the “product of compromise” between “branded pharmaceutical
firms and generic manufacturers”); Joanna M. Shepherd, Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and
Barriers to Entry, 25 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 156 (2015) (describing the scheme as “a
compromise on barriers to entry between original drug manufacturers and subsequent
potential entrants”); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Evaluating Flexibility in International
Patent Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 206 (2013) (“Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act can be
categorized as a complex legislative scheme, negotiated with all the relevant stakeholders,
and administered by the Food and Drug Administration.”). Counsel for the generic industry
association during the policymaking process described the scheme as a private agreement
“hammered out” by representatives of both industries. See Alfred B. Engelberg, Special
Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 J.L. &
Tech. 389, 400 (1999), http://www.ipmall.info/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/IDEA/11.
Engelberg99.pdf.
21
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The
Hatch-Waxman Act was accordingly a compromise between two competing sets of interests:
those of innovative drug manufacturers, who had seen their effective patent terms shortened
by the testing and regulatory processes; and those of generic drug manufacturers, whose entry
into the market upon expiration of the innovator’s patents had been delayed by similar
regulatory requirements.”); Abbott Labs. v. Young, 276 F.3d 627, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“As
the majority correctly notes, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments were the product of
compromise.”); Tri-Bio Labs. Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating
that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments “reflect a statutory compromise of the competing
concerns”); Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (C.D. Cal. 2002),
aff’d, 324 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“After the subcommittee favorably reported the bill,
Representative Henry Waxman of California conducted extensive negotiations with
representatives of both generic and brand name pharmaceutical companies that generated a
compromise that addressed the generic marketing and patent term aspects. This compromise
was the basic language of the bill that became the Hatch-Waxman Act.”); Mylan Pharms. Inc.
v. Henney, 94 F. Supp. 2d 36, 52 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated sub nom., Pharmachemie B.V. v.
Barr Lab., Inc., 276 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“As this Circuit observed nearly a decade ago,
that Hatch-Waxman struck a compromise between pioneer and generic makers . . . .”).
22
E.g., Sachs, supra note 20, at 383–84.
23
E.g., Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53,
69 (2016); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug?
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
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Curiously, however, there have been few published histories of the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments since the accounts written contemporaneously
by participants in the policymaking process.24 This Article steps into the gap
by offering a contextualized history of the statute and describing its political
economy. It takes a public choice approach, examining the role of
participation and influence on policymaking.25
Beginning in the late 1970s, citing studies showing a decline in
innovation, regulated patent owners sought restoration of the portions of
their patent terms lost to premarket testing and federal agency review.26 The
final legislative proposal, which would have applied to many regulated
industries, very nearly became law.27 Understanding the political economy
of the 1984 legislation requires understanding why these proposals had
majority and bipartisan support in Congress through the fall of 1982, as well
as how and why the tide turned.
Patent owners supported patent term restoration because it would
lengthen the period of time they could commercialize their patented products
and block competing copies. They had a strong incentive to organize and
argue for policy change. Generally, they argued for restoration on the ground
that it would restore (increase) incentives to innovate.28 Academic
economists bolstered this argument.29 With respect to drug patents, the FDA
L. REV. 299, 304 (2010); Sachs, supra note 20, at 383–84.
24
The primary accounts by participants are: Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt,
Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269 (1985);
Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration, 66 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 526, 529 (1984) [hereinafter
Lourie, Account]; Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration: History, Summary, and
Appraisal, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 351 (1985) [hereinafter Lourie, History, Summary, and
Appraisal]; Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999). Brief accounts appear in later
scholarly work. E.g., Ronald L. Desrosiers, Note, The Drug Patent Term: Longtime
Battleground in the Control of Health Care Costs, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 115 (1989); Daniel
I. Gorlin, Staving off Death: A Case Study of the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Strategies to
Protect Blockbuster Franchises, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 823 (2008); Sachs, supra note 20.
25
See generally Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987) (explaining public choice theory and its use in public law
scholarship). Few writers have considered the application of public choice theory to the
legislation. Professor Sachs included the Hatch-Waxman legislation in an article on
application of public choice theory to patent statutes; I address her analysis infra note 445.
See also F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An
Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J.
327, 408 (2006) (commenting that “the Hatch-Waxman Act was very much a collective
bargaining process that raised a host of public choice, administrative and market power
problems”).
26
See infra Section III.
27
See infra Section III.A.4.
28
See infra Section III.
29
See infra Section III.
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supported restoration, perhaps to protect its premarket regulatory program,
which was viewed as responsible for the truncation of patent terms. The
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) supported restoration on theoretical
grounds, because it would compensate for time sacrificed to federal
government requirements and ensure equal treatment of patent owners.
The competitors of these patent owners would have borne the cost of
this legislation (a longer wait before launching competing products using the
inventions), but they were not as well organized, perhaps because of the
differing industries involved. With respect to drugs in particular, the public
was also perceived to bear the costs through a delay in generic drug entry,
which meant it would pay more for medicine for a longer period of time.
Public Citizen, which had formed in 1971, made this pricing argument for
the public, leading to a clash in views about where the public’s interest lay.
Opponents also focused on the empirical case for restoration, for instance
questioning the supposed decline in innovation, questioning its causes, and
questioning whether longer patents would lead to more innovation.
Until the fall of 1982, however, there was bipartisan support in
Congress and widespread support from influential third parties including the
national media. The final bill passed the Senate. In the House, however, it
had been placed on the suspension calendar and fell five votes short of the
supermajority needed for passage. A variety of explanations have been
offered for its defeat, but overconfidence surely played a role.
In addition, however, the tide was already turning. The generic industry
had coalesced around the issue of patent term restoration during the winter
of 1981 to 1982, invoking the public’s interest in lower drug prices. And by
the spring of 1983, the generic companies had experienced a series of
policymaking defeats in Congress, at the FDA, and in the courts, that
propelled them to organize and push for legislation advancing their own
interests. They sought legislation that would allow them to reach the market
earlier and on the basis of applications omitting clinical data. They would
rely on the data submitted by patent owners. The public would benefit, they
argued, through earlier access to (their) less expensive medicines. They
formed a new lobbying group, headed by a charismatic Washington insider,
and they secured the support of Henry Waxman (D-CA), a relatively new
but already influential member of the U.S. House who sought to make his
name in health and environmental policymaking.
Representative Waxman introduced a placeholder bill in the summer of
1983. The broad contours of the legislation were then hammered out in
private between July 1983 and January 1984. Waxman and his staff filled in
the details during the spring, however, with provisions that surprised and
disappointed patent owners. Only modest changes were made after this
point. Some of the non-pharmaceutical patent owners split off, realizing
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their own prospects for meaningful patent term restoration had dimmed with
joinder to drug pricing issues. Although for the most part the language was
presented to policymakers as a “done deal” in June, there was modest
tinkering in the summer, and Senator Hatch and Representative Waxman put
forward a series of final changes in August partly in response to concerns
about the constitutionality of the legislation.
This paper makes two claims about the final legislation.
First, the conventional wisdom about the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments—that each side gained and each side lost—is wrong. The two
industries sought directly conflicting policy outcomes. Considering each
industry’s position before enactment and after enactment shows clearly that
the generic industry emerged in a better position, while the patent owners
emerged in a worse position. Understanding this requires understanding the
state of the law and the position each industry was in before enactment. That
the benefits accrued to one group while the costs were borne by the other
group is not meant as a normative claim or a claim about the allocation of
benefits and costs under the scheme as it operates today. Rather, it is a
historical claim—that in September 1984, the generic industry clearly
emerged in a better place, and the innovating industry emerged in a worse
place.
Second, this outcome can be explained by a Baptists-and-bootleggers
alliance between the generic industry and Public Citizen. The generic
companies argued that their proposed policy changes would increase and
accelerate the supply of less expensive drugs. They urged these policy
changes because they would be selling the drugs in question and would profit
from the legislation’s passage. But they managed to equate their own
financial interests with the interests of the general public, and their policy
proposal benefited from the strong support of Public Citizen and the
entrepreneurship of Representative Waxman. Patent owners had very little
leverage after losing the patent term restoration vote in September 1982, and
once the alliance between Public Citizen and the generic industry association
was cemented, the drug patent owners would have been lucky to hang onto
the status quo.
Although it makes only historical claims, this Article could have
normative implications. More than thirty years of scholarship, and policy
reform proposals today, are grounded in the assumption that the HatchWaxman Amendments benefitted both industries. Indeed, some scholars
assume that it benefitted the patent owners. Instead, it was a policymaking
defeat for the innovators. Scholars, third-party opinion-shapers, and
policymakers considering current policies and practices, as well as reform
proposals, should understand this. And they should know that it resulted
from an alliance between generic drug companies and Public Citizen, though
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these are not, in fact, always fully aligned. This Article provides the basis
for a clearer understanding of what happened in 1984 and perhaps normative
work considering alternatives to the Hatch-Waxman framework or
reassessment of the original patent term restoration proposals.
Section II of this Article describes the interaction between patent life
and new drug approval that laid the groundwork for the restoration
proposals. Section III tells the history of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments,
beginning with the defeat of the Kastenmeier patent term restoration
proposal in 1982 and then turning to the generic drug industry’s
policymaking defeats from 1979 to 1983, the introduction of generic drug
legislation in the spring of 1983, and the development of the final legislation
from July 1983 to September 1984. Section IV explains the political
economy of the 1984 legislation, and the Conclusion offers brief thoughts on
the implications of this Article’s claims.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Distorted Patent Terms
1. Early Filings
Since the founding of the Republic, and in accordance with express
recognition in the U.S. Constitution, federal law has protected an inventor’s
rights in his or her invention.30 In general, if a process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter is useful and not obvious, and if the
patent application satisfies certain additional requirements, the Patent Act
will secure the inventor’s exclusive right to the invention for a fixed time. 31
During this time, the inventor may exclude others from making, using, or
selling the invention without permission.32 As a practical matter, the right to
exclude confers additional benefits, including the ability to provide that
permission to others (to “license” the patent) and the ability to sell
embodiments of the invention in a market that lacks copies and possibly
close substitutes.
Various doctrines of patent law provide a strong incentive to file for a
patent as soon as possible after invention. For instance, the PTO will
generally deny a patent if the invention was described in a printed
publication, or in public use, more than a year before the patent application
was filed.33 Today, the PTO awards the patent to the first to file a patent
30

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112, 154 (2018).
32
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018)
33
The 1952 statute precluded a patent if the invention was in public use in the United
States or described in a printed publication more than a year before the filing date. 35 U.S.C.
31
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application, which also pushes inventors into filing as soon as possible so
that another person does not secure the patent first.34 In some cases, this
early patenting occurs well before the invention takes the form of a product
that will be commercially successful. As Professor Sichelman shows,
transforming a prototype into a commercially viable product can require
years of experimentation with product features as well as extensive market
testing.35 The nature and extent of the testing is a business judgment, as the
inventor focuses on identifying features that will cost-effectively attract
customers and minimize liability.36
Whether early patenting is beneficial remains disputed in the academic
literature.37 One concern, voiced by Professor Abramowicz, is germane to
the history of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. Abramowicz suggests that
delays before commercialization increase the risk of patent
“underdevelopment” (less investment in development of the invention than
if the patent term had been longer) and “non-development” (abandonment of
inventions that might have been developed if the patent term had been
longer).38 These risks intensify, he explains, if the post-patent cost of
development and time to market are substantial. He gives the example of
pharmaceuticals. Although he does not explore the point, pharmaceuticals
differ from other products with lengthy commercialization delays because
the commercialization delay derives from federal regulatory requirements.
2. Premarket Regulation
The essence of drug discovery is the uncovering or creation of a new
active ingredient with useful physiological effects and thus therapeutic
potential. Biological assays (for instance, using cells in the laboratory) and
§ 102(b) (1952). Today, public use anywhere in the world and description in a printed
publication defeat novelty, although there is an exception for disclosures by the inventor in
the final year before the effective filing date (or by a third party during that same period after
disclosure by the inventor). 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
34
35 U.S.C. § 102.
35
Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 347–53 (2010)
(describing the process from invention to commercialization for a particular product, to show
the “risky and costly efforts often involved”).
36
E.g., id. at 350–51.
37
Compare Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348,
352 n.11 (1968) (arguing that early patents prevent wasteful duplication of effort during what
would otherwise be a longer pre-patent development phase), and Edmund W. Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276–78 (1977) (arguing that
early patenting may allow the patent owner to coordinate inventive activity with others,
creating social value), with Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law,
61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 88 (2009) (arguing that broad early patent filings necessitate more
detailed applications later, burdening the patent system).
38
Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL
L. REV. 1065, 1074 (2007).
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animal tests substantiate the physiological effects and allow the inventor to
describe the molecule’s activity in a patent application.39 Patent law allows
one to establish utility on the basis of laboratory and animal testing data.40
But the federal government has required premarket applications for
new drugs since 1938 and for biological medicines since 1902.41 And the
government does not approve active ingredients. Instead, it approves a
finished product, meaning a particular formulation (a combination of active
and inactive ingredients, such as excipients and buffers, tailored to have
particular properties), as well as a particular presentation (route of
administration, dosage form, and strength), and particular labeling for
prescribers.42 Moreover, the government will approve a medicine only if the
applicant proves the product effective for a particular use (known as its
“indication”) described in the labeling.43 Effectiveness for FDA purposes
differs from utility for patent law purposes; it is a regulatory concept and a
higher bar. The regulatory statute requires “substantial evidence” to support
the indication.44 This in turn requires statistically rigorous analysis of data
from one or two “adequate and well-controlled” clinical trials testing a
hypothesis about the use.45
Federal law requires the applicant to take a phased approach to
development of these data.46 A firm must first submit laboratory and animal
testing results showing that it would be ethical to conduct trials in humans.47
Once the FDA permits trials to begin, the firm must begin with small trials,
39

See generally JP Hughes et al., Principles of Early Drug Discovery, 162 BRIT. J.
PHARMACOLOGY 1239 (2011).
40
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (holding that invention must have
“substantial utility” in the form of a “specific benefit” that is “currently available”); In re
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that “proof of an alleged pharmaceutical
property for a compound by statistically significant tests with standard experimental animals
is sufficient to establish utility”); Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(finding utility on basis of in vitro demonstration of claimed biological activity, preventing
aggregation of platelets).
41
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052
(1938); Biologics Control Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728, 728-29 (1902).
42
Erika Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV. 39, 71 (2018)
[hereinafter Lietzan, Innovation Paradox].
43
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2018); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(viii) (2018); Lietzan,
Innovation Paradox, supra note 42. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2018).
44
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (requiring “substantial evidence” of effectiveness); see also
Procedures for Review of Safety, Effectiveness, and Labeling, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,679 (Aug. 18,
1972) (explaining that the agency will apply a more flexible version of “substantial evidence”
to biologics).
45
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (defining “substantial evidence” as data from at least one “adequate
and well-controlled [investigation]”); 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2018) (describing an “adequate
and well-controlled [investigation]”).
46
See Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 52.
47
See generally 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2018).
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often in healthy volunteers.48 These trials generate safety information and
information about how the body processes the drug. The second phase of
testing involves more subjects, often with the disease under investigation,
and generates preliminary measurements of the drug’s effects on the body as
well as information about optimal dosing.49 The process ends with trials
designed to test whether use of a particular finished product (which the
company plans to commercialize) achieves a particular clinical endpoint in
a specific population.50 The marketing application describes the product,
how it is made, and the data generated during research and development.51
The patent owner has little control over the length of the premarket
testing and approval process.52 As a regulatory matter, the premarket
requirements are more likely to turn on the drug’s chemical class, the disease
targeted, how well the disease is understood, the drug’s mechanism of action,
the clinical outcomes possible, and other available treatments.53 Today the
process from discovery to FDA approval averages ten to twelve years, but it
can be much shorter or, indeed, much longer.54 Recent empirical work shows
that drugs for some types of use—such as drugs for diseases of the central
nervous system—consistently take longer.55
The aspects of patent doctrine that counsel early filings nevertheless
apply with equal force in the pharmaceutical setting. Use of an invention in
a clinical trial may constitute disqualifying public use.56 Scientific
publications describing clinical research results may disqualify the invention
for a patent.57 Conventional wisdom holds that the patent for the active
ingredient of a potential new drug should be filed before clinical testing
48

21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a).
21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
50
21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c).
51
21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50, 601.2.
52
Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 62–63.
53
Id. at 110.
54
Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of
R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20 (2016).
55
Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 110–11.
56
Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MO. L. REV. 645, 659–60 (2011) (discussing whether clinical
trials are patent-invalidating public use of the claimed invention); see also Dey, L.P. v.
Sunovian Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (reversing summary judgment
on public use issue and listing cases in which courts have declined to find “public use” when
investigators sign confidentiality agreements); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms.,
Inc., 471 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that Lilly’s trials of olanzapine were not public
use, considering confidentiality of the study and experimental character of the tests).
57
See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1324–25
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining how prior publication forced Ortho-McNeil to narrow scope of
patent); Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX.
L. REV. 503, 523–24 (2009) (offering examples).
49
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starts.58 This appears to be common practice.59
3. Patent Term Distortion
Premarket regulation combines with early patent filings to create what
the Supreme Court describes as “patent distortion.”60 Today a patent lasts
for twenty years, starting when the inventor files the patent application.61 If
the inventor spends a decade testing embodiments for regulatory purposes—
animal testing to justify a clinical program, followed by three phases of
clinical trials—only ten years of patent life remain when the FDA approves
the finished product for the market. This is the product’s “effective patent
life,” meaning the portion of the patent term during which the patent owner
may lawfully sell embodiments of the invention while excluding others from
doing so. Before 1995, when a patent lasted for seventeen years from
issuance, the same thing happened. Ordinarily the patent issued during
clinical trials, so a substantial period of the patent term lapsed before FDA
approval. If the patent applicant filed a continuation or continuation-in-part
application, the patent might issue later in time and thus expire later.62 But
so long as the patent issued during the premarket program, some portion of
its term would be sacrificed. Under either patent scheme, the federal drug
regulatory system leads to a shortened effective patent life.
The distortion affects more than just the initial active ingredient patent.
The final product comprises not only a particular active ingredient, but a
particular formulation, route of administration, dosage form, and strength, as
well as labeling that describes the indication and provides instructions for
use. These aspects of the product are typically worked out over the course
of the premarket program. As the finished product’s features take shape
through new discoveries, the company seeks additional patent coverage.
Whether it can file a new original patent application or must instead file a
continuation or continuation-in-part will depend on the new discovery and
the scope of the original patent disclosure. But the distortion appears either
way. A new original patent will generally expire later than the initial active
ingredient patent. Before 1995, a continuation patent would have similarly
58

Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 348 (2007) (noting that applications for “composition of
matter” patents are filed before clinical testing); Roin, supra note 57, at 539 (stating that
pharmaceutical patents “are typically filed when drugs are in early preclinical research”).
59
Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 86.
60
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990).
61
35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018).
62
A continuation application relies on the disclosure in an earlier filed (“parent”)
application, but the scope of its claims is different. A continuation-in-part application
similarly refers to the parent application but can add subject matter. See U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) 201.07–201.08
(9th ed. 2018).
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expired later, because the patent term lasted seventeen years from issuance.
Today it will expire twenty years after the filing of its parent application. In
each case, though, some portion of the term lapses before the FDA permits
the inventor to sell a product that includes the invention. The regulatory
system still distorts the patent.
4. An Emergent Problem
Distortion of drug patent terms emerged as a problem in the third
quarter of the 20th century when an explosion in medical innovation and
pharmaceutical patenting coincided with growth of the administrative state.
The first modern medicines were launched in the early 1900s, with the
discovery of insulin and the introduction of sulfa drugs, barbiturates,
amphetamine, and heparin.63 By the late 1940s, there were applications in
effect for penicillin drugs, morphine, phenobarbital, epinephrine, niacin,
codeine, testosterone, progesterone, conjugated estrogens, digitalis,
benzocaine, and theophylline, many of which are still viewed as essential
today.64 But the big leap forward occurred when academic researchers began
collaborating with the predecessors of today’s research based companies.65
Companies introduced an average of forty-three new chemical entities per
year in the 1950s.66 The FDA received applications for acetaminophen and
new antibiotics, for example, as well as drugs to treat hypertension,
anticoagulants, early cancer drugs, and the first oral contraceptive.67 Some
call the 1950s the decade of the “miracle drug.”68
The inventors of these drugs sought patent protection. The medical and
scientific establishments had opposed pharmaceutical patenting in the 19th
century.69 In the early decades of the 20th century, though, academic
63

Suzanne Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History, in A QUICK GUIDE
Davies & Faiz Kermani eds., 2008).
64
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EVER APPROVED DRUGS LIST [hereinafter EVER
APPROVED DRUGS LIST] (obtained via Freedom of Information Act Request) (on file with
author); see WHO Essential Medicines: 20th List, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/en/ (last updated Aug. 2017)
65
DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 118–22 (2010); Joseph M. Gabriel,
Pharmaceutical Patenting and the Transformation of American Medical Ethics, 49 BRIT. J.
HIST. SCI. 577, 587 (2016); Nicolas Rasmussen, The Drug Industry and Clinical Research in
Interwar America: Three Types of Physician Collaborator, 79 BULL. HIST. MED. 50 (2005).
66
SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE 1962
AMENDMENTS 13 (1974).
67
EVER APPROVED DRUGS LIST, supra note 64.
68
E.g., HARRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE AND THERAPEUTIC
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1990 149 (1997).
69
Gabriel, supra note 65, at 585, 587. In the early 19th century, the orthodox medical
community opposed patenting because it viewed commercialism as unseemly and because it
equated patenting with secrecy, the province of quack medicines. Id. at 578–82. AMA
TO CLINICAL TRIALS (Madhu
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researchers began to patent their discoveries, often assigning these patents to
their host institutions or other institutions with which they affiliated.70 The
domestic research-based companies also began to patent their discoveries.71
The broader scientific and public health communities remained ambivalent
about patenting medicines for several more decades. But when the academic
medical community and research-based pharmaceutical companies began to
collaborate in earnest in the 1950s and 1960s, with “impressive therapeutic
dividends” as Professor Gabriel put it, pharmaceutical patenting became
viewed as “ethically legitimate and even necessary, as a part of the incentive
structure that underlay the development of powerful new drugs.”72
The administrative apparatus that truncates drug patent terms emerged
at exactly the same time. Premarket review of new drugs dates to 1938, but
early applications were based on safety data and modest in size and scope.73
Regulators and academic scientists developed the randomized, controlled,
blinded clinical trial for proof of therapeutic claims in the 1940s.74 The FDA
began routinely asking for outcomes data in the 1950s.75 In 1962, Congress
enacted a premarket-approval requirement and required companies to
provide substantial evidence of effectiveness, and the FDA’s expectations
about the content and scope of applications grew more rigorous over the
following decades.76 The average time from the first clinical trial to FDA
approval increased threefold or fourfold, to around seven years, between
1950 and 1965.77 The requirements for preclinical testing—which an
prohibited holding patents and prescribing patented goods. Id. at 580. Early U.S. companies,
such as Parke-Davis (now Pfizer) and E.R. Squibb (now Bristol-Myers Squibb), eschewed
patents and trade secrets. Id.
70
For example, the University of Toronto held the 1923 patent for insulin. U.S. Patent
No. 1,469,994 (filed Oct. 9, 1923).
71
Gabriel, supra note 65, at 587. For instance, Parke-Davis (now Pfizer) owned at least
eight patents issued in the 1920s directed to chemicals for medicinal use or methods of
medical treatment. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 1,717,198 (filed June 11, 1929) (claiming “[a]n
immunizing product comprising washings from disease-producing microorganisms, said
washings containing antigens specific to said organisms and being substantially free from said
organisms and from specific bacterial toxins and specific bacterial proteins of said
organisms”).
72
Gabriel, supra note 65, at 592–93.
73
Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 49–52
74
Geoffrey Marshall et al., Streptomycin Treatment of Pulmonary Tuberculosis: A
Medical Research Council Investigation, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 769 (1948) (report of first such trial);
Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 50–51.
75
21 Fed. Reg. 5576, 5578 (July 25, 1956) (promulgating 21 C.F.R. § 130.4, describing
contents of application).
76
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780; see Lietzan, Innovation
Paradox, supra note 42, at 52–54.
77
Harold Clymer, The Changing Costs of Pharmaceutical Innovation (1965), reprinted
in THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG INNOVATION (Cooper ed., 1970). The Commissioner of Food
and Drugs confirmed in early 1968 that new drugs averaged seven years from the beginning
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inventor must complete before starting human trials—became more rigorous
and time consuming in the same decades.78
These developments distorted patent terms. By the late 1960s, average
effective patent life for new drugs had dropped to 13.9 years, and it dropped
to 12.4 years by the early 1970s.79 By 1979, the average dropped to 9.5
years.80 One study found that a quarter of the erosion in patent life was
attributable to an increase in the time between patent filings and the start of
clinical trials, when the inventor conducts preclinical testing.81 Half of the
erosion was attributable to an increase in the time between the start of clinical
trials and regulatory approval.82
5. Scope of the Problem
The new administrative state distorted patents in several fields of
technology. Since 1958, for instance, federal law has required premarket
approval of food additives.83 A food additive petition must establish that the
additive is safe and accomplishes its intended use.84 Generating these data
and securing FDA approval can take six years or longer.85 Since 1960, color
additives used in food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics have been subject to a
similar preapproval requirement.86 The petition must contain chemical,
toxicological, and environmental data,87 and the premarket timeline is
comparable.88 Since 1962, a new animal drug has required an approved
application showing safety and effectiveness for its labeled use.89 The

of clinical trials until FDA approval. Harold A. Clymer, The Changing Costs and Risks of
Innovation in Drug Development, 13 RES. MGMT. 375, 381 (1970) (quoting James Goddard).
78
See infra note 227.
79
DAVID SCHWARTZMAN, INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 173 (1976).
80
Martin M. Eisman & William M. Wardell, The Decline in Effective Patent Life of New
Drugs, 24 RES. MGMT. 18, 20 (1981); see also Peter Barton Hutt, The Importance of Patent
Term Restoration to Pharmaceutical Innovation, 1 HEALTH AFFS. 6, 16–17 (1982) (discussing
studies); Leonard G. Schifrin, Lessons from the Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the
1962 Drug Regulations, 5 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (1982) (discussing studies).
81
Eisman & Wardell, supra note 80, at 20.
82
Id. A final quarter was because the Patent Office issued patents faster. Id.
83
Food Additive Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784 (1958).
84
21 U.S.C. §§ 348(b)(2), (c) (2012).
85
INST. OF MED., ENHANCING THE REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING APPROVAL PROCESS
FOR DIRECT FOOD INGREDIENT TECHNOLOGIES: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 29, n.230 (1999).
86
Color Additive Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618, 74 Stat. 397 (1960).
87
21 U.S.C. § 379e (2018); Andrew J. Zajac & Julie N. Barrows, FDA’s Regulation of
Color Additives, FOOD SAFETY MAG., Oct./Nov. 2017, https://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/
magazine-archive1/octobernovember-2017/fdae28099
s-regulation-of-color-additives/.
88
Brief for Procter & Gamble Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (No. 89-243), 1989 WL 1127523, at *2.
89
21 U.S.C. §§ 360b(a)(1), (b), (d) (2018).
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research and development process averages 6.5 years for drugs intended for
companion animals and 8.5 years for drugs intended for livestock.90 Since
1976, higher-risk medical devices have required premarket approval from
the FDA.91 The application must provide a reasonable assurance of the
device’s safety and effectiveness, which generally requires data from clinical
trials.92 The premarket process averages three to seven years from concept
to market.93 Other regulators apply premarket testing and approval
requirements to patented products.
Veterinary biologics—vaccines,
diagnostic kits, and other products of biologic origin intended for veterinary
use—require a license under the Virus, Serum, Toxin Act of 1913 issued by
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).94 The applications
contain safety and effectiveness data,95 which take an average of 5.5 years to
generate.96 No one may market a pesticide without a license from the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), issued under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.97 Applications contain data on
product performance (effectiveness and usefulness) and potential risks to
human health and the environment (safety).98 Testing, development, and
registration of a new pesticide can take eight to ten years.99 Some new
chemicals require premarket review by EPA under the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA).100
90
About Animal Medicines: Pharmaceuticals, ANIMAL HEALTH INST.,
https://www.ahi.org/about-animal-medicines/pharmaceuticals (last visited July 22, 2018).
91
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976); 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(1)(C) (defining class III devices), § 360e (requiring premarket approval of class III
devices).
92
21 U.S.C. § 360e; 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2015).
93
Kyle M. Fargen et al., The FDA Approval Process for Medical Devices: An Inherently
Flawed System or a Valuable Pathway for Innovation?, 5 J. NEUROINTERVENTIONAL SURGERY
269, 270 (2013).
94
Pub. L. 430, 72 Stat. 832 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 151–158).
95
9 C.F.R. § 102.3 (2010); Veterinary Services Memorandum 800.50 (Feb. 9, 2011).
96
This number reflects the five veterinary biologics for which patent owners have sought
patent term restoration under 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2018). For each product, APHIS published
the number of days in the “regulatory review period,” which began when it authorized
preparation of an experimental veterinary biologic and ended when it issued a license. See 68
Fed. Reg. 17,335 (Apr. 9, 2003); 68 Fed. Reg. 24,705 (May 8, 2003); 72 Fed. Reg. 52,847
(Sept. 17, 2007); 74 Fed. Reg. 37,000 (July 29, 2009); 82 Fed. Reg. 16,337 (Apr. 4, 2017).
97
7 U.S.C. § 136a (2018).
98
40 C.F.R. § 152.50; 40 C.F.R. § 152.80; see generally, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
PESTICIDE REGISTRATION MANUAL (2017), https://www.epa.gov/pesticideregistration/
pesticide-registration-manual.
99
The Pesticide Marketplace: Discovering and Developing New Products, PURDUE
UNIVERSITY: PURDUE EXTENSION 10 (2006), https://www.extension.purdue.edu/extmedia/
PPP/PPP-71.pdf.
100
15 U.S.C. § 2604 (2018); David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, Its History and Key
Underlying Assumptions, and its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 333, 353 (2010).
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B. Policy Proposals to Address Patent Term Distortion
The idea of restoring patents shortened by regulatory testing and
premarket approval requirements emerged during the Carter Administration.
When he took office in 1977, President Carter launched a “Domestic Policy
Review of Industrial Innovation,” on the theory that increasing innovation
would reduce inflation, create jobs, and improve the country’s trade
position.101 The Secretary of Commerce chaired a Cabinet-level committee
that coordinated the policy review and solicited the views of an advisory
committee of outside experts.102 “More than 150 senior representatives from
the industrial, public interest, labor, scientific, and academic communities”
convened in subcommittees during the fall and winter of 1978 to consider
the effect of the federal government on industrial innovation.103 Although
industry dominated Carter’s Domestic Policy Review, pharmaceutical
companies were not heavily involved.104
After seven public symposia in January 1979, the subcommittees
submitted final reports. Two subcommittees addressed patent life for
regulated industries.105 First, a subcommittee considering environmental,
health, and safety regulations voiced concern that new drugs with short
expected patent life “cannot be developed economically” and “are not
developed.”106 It proposed that drug patent terms start with drug approval.107
A public interest subcommittee, staffed by executives from organizations
such as the Consumer Protection Association, responded to the suggestion
that regulations cause commercialization delays, but focused on EPA and
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations,
suggesting that companies deluged these agencies with documents and bore
some responsibility for the delay.108 Second, a subcommittee considering
patent policy proposed patent extensions.109 This group, which did not limit
its inquiry to drug patents or even regulated patentees, sought to “remedy”

101
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ADVISORY COMM. ON INDUS. INNOVATION FINAL REP. iii
(1979) [hereinafter CARTER REPORT]; see also CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, SCIENCE POLICY FROM
FORD TO REAGAN: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 30 (1982) (noting that policymakers sought to
“reindustrialize” the country to improve its economic performance).
102
CARTER REPORT, supra note 101, at ii–iii.
103
Id. at iii.
104
Senior executives from the industry filled the twenty-three positions on the
environment, health, and safety subcommittee, but only four came from large drug companies.
Id. at 37–38. Only one of the fifteen members of the patent policy subcommittee came from
the pharmaceutical industry. Id. at 118–19.
105
Id. at 149, 157.
106
Id. at 59.
107
Id.
108
CARTER REPORT, supra note 101, at 87.
109
Id. at 157, 162.
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the “inequity” of patent terms starting before commercialization.110 It
proposed “compensation” equivalent to the “period of delay,” and
“measured from the time an inventor has adequate evidence of commercial
embodiment of the invention.”111 The public interest subcommittee
responded by asking, somewhat rhetorically, whether the patent term should
also be shortened when patent owners fail to commercialize.112 It again
suggested that regulated patentees “fight” regulations and “deliver
truckloads of documentation”—presumably also a reference to companies
regulated by the EPA and OSHA—and argued that commercialization delays
might increase if patents expired later.113
Separately, after hearing from a broad array of stakeholders, including
the FDA and academics, the National Research Council of the National
Academies of Science (NAS) issued a report recommending that
policymakers address truncated patent life.114 “Patent incentives,” it wrote
in 1979, “might be employed to offset the negative impact on R&D
incentives in highly innovative sectors like drugs and medical devices, which
are also likely to be subject to particularly stringent forms of regulation over
the foreseeable future.”115 The report suggested that patent life start “when
regulatory approval is granted, thereby restoring the effective patent life to
the nominal life of 17 years.”116
III. HISTORY OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS
Patent term extension was not a new idea. More than 1000 patents had
been extended over the course of U.S. history.117 Under the Patent Act of
1836, for instance, a patent owner could obtain a seven-year extension of the
fourteen-year patent term by showing that, without fault or negligence, he
had failed to obtain “reasonable remuneration for the time, ingenuity, and
expense” of developing the invention and “the introduction thereof into
use.”118 After Congress eliminated the statutory extension authority in 1861,
110

Id. at 162.
Id.
112
Id. at 198.
113
Id. at 86–87, 198.
114
HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., THE IMPACT OF
REGULATION ON INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION vii–ix (1979).
115
Id. at 55.
116
Id.
117
Indeed, more than 1100 patents had been extended by 1874. A complete list of
extensions from 1790 to 1873 appears in 2 SUBJECT-MATTER INDEX OF PATENTS FOR
INVENTIONS ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE FROM 1790 TO 1873, at 1912–25
(Leggett, ed. 1874).
118
Act of July 4, 1836, 5 Stat. 124; see also Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas
Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007) (discussing extensions under 1836 statute).
111
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patent owners obtained extensions through private bills.119 Many sought
private extensions on the ground that they had not received sufficient profit
during the statutory term.120 The key House Committee decided in the 1870s
that such an extension would be granted if the invention was valuable, the
lack of adequate compensation stemmed from causes beyond the control of
the inventor as well as a person of reasonable prudence and foresight, and
the public would not be essentially injured.121 In other cases, a 1978
congressional report explained that private relief was appropriate because
the government had “a moral or ethical obligation toward the party.”122
Rather than this private patent extension history, however, the patent
policy subcommittee cited the handling of secrecy orders under the Invention
Secrecy Act of 1951.123 Under this law, if disclosure of an invention might
harm national security, the Commissioner of Patents must withhold the
patent grant.124 Prosecution of the patent continues until the patent could
issue, but the patent does not issue.125 Although an order lasts for one year,
it can be renewed, and some last decades.126 Meanwhile, the government
may use the invention.127 Once the government lifts the order and allows the
patent to issue, the inventor receives the full patent term. The inventor may
also receive compensation for the government’s use of the invention and for
“damage” caused by the secrecy order.128 Although the legislative history of

119

A private bill provides relief to a specific individual, corporation, or institution—
typically an exemption from, or modification of, otherwise-applicable law. Congress also
changed the patent term to seventeen years in 1861. Patent Act of 1861, Pub. L. No. 36-42,
12 Stat. 246.
120
CHRISTINE P. BENAGH, CRS. HISTORY OF PRIV. PAT. LEGIS. H.R. 10 (1978), reprinted
in Private Patent Legislation: Hearing on H. R. 2882 before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 104–05
(1984) [hereinafter PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION].
121
H.R. REP. NO. 45-177 (1879).
122
PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120. The report cited extension of U.S.
Patent. No. 19,023 in December 1944 as a “classic example.” Id. This patent had been found
invalid by a judge later convicted of taking payment for the verdict in question. Id. See
generally Priv. L. No. 554, 58 Stat. 1095 (1944); United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d
Cir. 1939).
123
CARTER REPORT, supra note 101, at 157.
124
35 U.S.C. § 181 (2018).
125
35 U.S.C. § 181.
126
35 U.S.C. § 181; e.g., Stein v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 265, 266 (D. Mass. 2001)
(noting secrecy order from April 1973 to March, 2000,); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States,
685 F.2d 1361, 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (noting secrecy order from May 1949 to June 1975).
127
35 U.S.C. § 183 (2018).
128
35 U.S.C. § 183. Damage might include loss in market value because of the time
shifting (for instance, because the technology became obsolete). Compensation is rare in
practice. See Cynthia M. Ho, Inoculation Inventions: The Interplay of Infringement and
Immunity in the Development of Biodefense Vaccines, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 111, 138
(2005).
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the 1951 statute is thin,129 courts generally characterize the goal as
compensatory.130 In theory, the statute restores the inventor to the position
he would have occupied without the government’s intervention.
The more analogous precedents might have been the statutes governing
restoration of patents issued to soldiers. Under the World War I Patent
Extension Act, any patent holder who served honorably in the military
between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918, was eligible for a patent
extension of three times his length of service.131 The House Committee on
Patents explained that the goal was to “extend the monopoly given to these
men, if by reason of the fact that they were taken into service, they lost the
income that they would otherwise have received, or if that income was
reduced during the time spent in the military service.”132 These men were
“entitled” to an extension, and an extension of three times the length of
service would be “equitable and just.”133 Supporters of the legislation
129
The formal history comprises one published hearing with two witnesses, a brief House
report, and a Senate report reprinting the House report. Patent Disclosure: Hearings Before
Subcomm. 3 on H.R. 4687, Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. (1951); H.R. REP. NO. 821028 (1951); S. REP. NO. 82-1001 (1951). This legislation replaced predecessor legislation
with similarly thin history. Under a 1917 statute, the government could impose a secrecy
order that would last throughout World War I. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 95, 40 Stat. 394.
During World War II but before the United States entered the war, Congress amended the
statute to authorize secrecy orders lasting as long as national interest required, but the statute
itself would expire in two years. Act of July 1, 1940, ch. 501, 54 Stat. 710. After the United
States entered the war, Congress changed the language back, so that secrecy orders would last
through the war. Act of June 16, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-415, 56 Stat. 370. Congress passed a
permanent law in 1951 because earlier orders remained in place, the government had imposed
additional orders, and the Korean War had started. Pub. L. No. 82-256, 66 Stat. 3 (1952); see
generally H.R. REP. NO. 96-1540, at 33–62 (1980) (recounting history of invention secrecy).
130
E.g., Linick v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 319, 320 (2012), aff’d, 515 F. App’x 892
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (mem.) (stating that Section 183 grants “a patent owner the right to seek ‘just
compensation’ for damage caused by a secrecy order”); Constant v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl.
148, 155 (1980) (stating that overall purpose of Section 183 “seems to be to provide a
comprehensive scheme for compensation to patent owners proving damages due to the
issuance of a secrecy order”)).
131
Act of May 31, 1928, ch. 992, § 1, 45 Stat. 1012 (1928).
132
H.R. REP. NO. 70-1314, at 2 (1928) (“When war was declared in April, 1917, and the
conscription act was passed, all able-bodied men were called to the colors, including men who
were the holders of patents; and it has developed that a few of them, at least had started to
build organizations for the development of the invention on which a patent had issued, but the
call to war caused a necessary abandonment of such organization, and the invention and
development were left at a standstill while the men were in service.”).
133
Id.; S. REP. NO. 70-1339, at 1 (1928) (containing identical language); see also
Extension of Time Limitations On Certain Patents: Hearing on S. 4927 Before the S. Comm.
on Patents, 69th Cong. 21 (1927) (hearing on an earlier version of the legislation) (“[T]he
sovereign has the duty to perform those things which will inspire in the breasts of citizens the
patriotism which it wants there and it has, in order to inspire that patriotism, always, from the
first beginning of the history of states, the sovereign has rewarded service rendered and has
always taken steps to see that the service rendered would not work an injustice to those who
rendered the service.”) (statement of Senator Stewart); id. (“[T]he Government, as a sovereign
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sometimes spoke of honoring a “contract” between the government and
patent owners, but the thrust was that the government had chosen a different
social goal and would make things right for the patent owners.134
The World War II Patent Extension Act was similarly meant “to
provide for an extension of the life of patents issued to veterans of World
War II, on the theory that their service would have in many cases precluded
them an opportunity to exploit their patents during that period.”135 Removal
from their occupations “effectively deprived them off their freedom to
exploit their patent rights.”136 The extension for the second World War was
limited to twice the veteran’s length of service.137
A. Patent Term Restoration
In April 1979, Representative Steven Symms (R-ID) introduced a twopage bill adopting the approach proposed by President Carter’s health and
safety subcommittee.138 The term of any patent issued for a new drug or
animal drug would begin on the date of patent issuance but end on the earlier
of either (a) seventeen years after drug approval or (b) twenty-seven years
after patent issuance.139 As a practical matter, the twenty-seven-year rule
would cabin the patent term only if the patent issued more than ten years
before drug approval. Otherwise, the seventeen-year rule would be the
operative limit, and drug patent owners would enjoy the full seventeen years.
The proposal can be analogized somewhat to the secrecy order framework.
Like regulatory premarket requirements, a secrecy order precludes
power, with all its ancient rights and justice and mercy will not permit an injury to be done”).
134
E.g., Extension of Time Limitations On Certain Patents: Hearing on S. 4927 Before
the S. Comm. on Patents, 69th Cong. 2 (1927) (statement of Arthur Rathjen, witness) (“[T]his
legislation . . . is for the purpose of curing an inequity resulting from the fact that the United
States Government violated a contractual relation with a certain class of citizens; that is, men
who were drafted into the service of the United States”); id. (“We have not treated you just
right. We made a contract with you. We did not keep it. We had something more important
to do. We put you to doing something which we thought was of a great deal more importance.
You could not develop your patent. And besides, your income was affected by it. We put
you in the Army and you could not do it. But, we will keep our faith with you. We will keep
our part of the contract.”).
135
H.R. REP. NO. 81-1214, at 33 (1949); see Act of June 30, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-598,
64 Stat. 316.
136
§ 1, 64 Stat. 316.
137
Id.
138
H.R. 3589, 96th Cong. (1979). Rep. Harold Sawyer (R-MI) had introduced similar
language during a markup of legislation that became the Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
94 Stat. 3015 (1980). He withdrew the amendment “with the understanding that the matter
would be taken up in the 97th Congress after an opportunity for thorough education and
study.” COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1982, H.R REP. NO.
97-696, at 6 (1982).
139
This bill was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, and Congress took no
further action.
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commercialization of an invention.140 After the PTO lifts the secrecy order,
the patent lasts for a normal term. Giving regulated products seventeen years
of effective patent life has the same effect. In both cases the patent is timeshifted but enjoyed in full.
The Symms bill launched a five-and-a-half-year-legislative process
considering patent term restoration for regulated patent owners. It was,
however, the only bill to specify a fixed term that would, by default, apply
equally to all drug patents, as well as the only one that overtly aimed for a
seventeen-year effective patent life. The Kastenmeier proposals, introduced
in 1980 and 1981, instead took the approach urged by the patent policy
subcommittee of tailoring the restoration to the time lost by each patentee,
as the veteran statutes had done.141
1. The Kastenmeier Proposals
The Kastenmeier proposals applied to any product subjected to federal
premarket regulatory review, including new drugs, new animal drugs, food
additives, color additives, human and veterinary biological products,
pesticides, and chemicals regulated under TSCA. Any patent covering such
a product or a method of using such a product would be extended by an
amount of time equal to the product’s “regulatory review period.”142 The
patent owner could recover only the portion of the regulatory review period
after patent issuance, which meant that effective patent life could not exceed
the statutory seventeen-year term.143 These bills also limited the number of
days the patent owner could recover; no extension could exceed seven
years.144 The drafters based this on the length of the average clinical testing
program and application review period for new drugs.145 The seven-year cap
meant that if a particular product’s premarket program took longer than the
average program for new drugs, the patent owner would lose those patent
140
35 U.S.C. § 186 (2018) (Disclosure of the invention—including through commercial
sales—is a federal crime).
141
Sen. Birch Bayh (D-IN) and Rep. Robert Kastenmeier (D-WI) introduced these bills
in 1980. Patent Term Restoration Act of 1980, S. 2892, 96th Cong. (1980); Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1980, H.R. 7952, 96th Cong. (1980). The bills were referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee and the House Committee on the Judiciary, respectively, and Congress
took no further action. Sen. Charles Mathias (R-MD) and Rep. Kastenmeier re-introduced
the bills in 1981. S. 255, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 1937, 97th Cong. (1981).
142
A new drug “regulatory review period” lasted from the date the company asked
permission to start clinical trials until the date the FDA permitted commercial sales. E.g., S.
2892, 96th Cong. § 155(c)(4) (1980).
143
E.g., S. 2892, 96th Cong. §§ 155(c)(4), 155(a) (1980).
144
E.g., S. 255, 97th Cong. § 155(a)(2) (1981).
145
Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 528. Both the industry and FDA had shown that
the time from the start of clinical trials to FDA approval averaged seven years in the late
1960s. See supra note 77. The legislative history does not explain why Kastenmeier capped
restoration at the average experience.
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years. Regardless of the cap, however, if a patent issued in the final seven
years before the product received marketing approval, the inventor would
enjoy seventeen years of patent life.
The Kastenmeier proposals borrowed more from the veteran statutes
than from the secrecy order framework. The veteran statutes added years to
the end of an already-issued patent, because the patentee had been unable to
commercialize the patent due to participation in the war effort.146 Patentterm restoration for regulated products would similarly add years to an
already-issued patent and similarly because the patent owner could not
commercialize the patent because of a federally-imposed obligation to
perform tasks advancing different national priorities.
There are, however, distinctions. First, no federal law precluded the
veteran from commercializing the patent during his service, which means
that some may have enjoyed passive revenue during the war and still
benefited from restoration. Although a regulated patent owner might receive
royalties on its patent during the premarket period, this income would be
modest because any licensee would be similarly unable to commercialize the
invention. Second, veterans received two or three times the number of days
lost to service in the war.147 The legislative history does not explain the
decision to multiply the days, but it may reflect the value placed on military
service and the moral standing of veterans at the time. Or it may reflect an
assumption that veterans lost more momentum in development of their
inventions than just days of actual service. But it meant that a veteran’s
ultimate effective patent life—even excluding passive life during the war—
could be more than the effective life enjoyed by others.
2. Bipartisan Support and Passage in the Senate
Throughout the policy-making process, supporters of patent-term
restoration identified two rationales for acting. First, patent-term restoration
would repair the incentive to innovate in regulated sectors of the economy.148
Second, restoration would compensate the patent owner for the portion of the
patent right sacrificed because of public policy objectives embedded in a

146

Some patent owners participated voluntarily; others did not. EXTENSION OF PATENTS
HELD BY VETERANS OF WORLD WAR II, H.R. REP. NO. 81-124, at 34 (1949).
147
The drafters of the World War I statute had proposed that all veterans receive seven
years, but the bill evolved to tie each veteran’s restoration to his days of service. E.g., Patents
of World War Soldiers: Hearings Held Before the Comm. on Patents of the H.R., 90th Cong.
44 (1928).
148
E.g., Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 305 (1981) (statement of
Lewis Engman, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) (discussing
“substantial consumer benefits from the innovations which will be encouraged by patent term
restoration”).
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statute administered by another part of the government.149 Some cast this in
terms of preventing discrimination or inequity; regulated inventors should
not be disadvantaged with shorter effective patent life than other inventors.150
Drug patent owners bolstered the case for restoration with empirical
studies finding a decline in the rate of new drug introductions over the years
when the effective patent life had grown shorter.151 The most influential
study was Professor Peltzman’s 1974 paper connecting the decline to the
1962 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),
which had introduced the formal requirement to provide substantial evidence
of effectiveness.152 Peltzman found that the number of new chemical entities
dropped from an average of forty-three each year in the decade before the
1962 amendments to an average of sixteen after the amendments.153
Working from different data sources, Professor Grabowski reported in 1976
that the average annual rate of new chemical entity introductions had
dropped from fifty-six (between 1950 and 1961) to around seventeen after
the 1962 law.154 FDA leadership at first questioned the reports but soon
confirmed a “declining number of new single entity drugs approved” in the
United States.155 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, when policymakers
149
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981, S. REP. NO.
97-138, at 1 (1981) (“S. 255 would remedy this unintended and inequitable side effect by
restoring to the term of the patent the time lost in complying with the government’s premarket
testing and review requirements”); The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. 15 (1983) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) (“I am a cosponsor of S.
1306, . . . because it . . . will restore the intent of the patent law to protect, for a set period of
time, the rights of a creator [in] the fruits of his labor. . . . Instead of having 17 years in which
to recover its investment, like firms in virtually all other industries, patent life is cut
substantially, almost in half.”).
150
E.g., The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 61 (1981) (statement of Arthur Smith, General Counsel for the
Office of Sponsored Programs at MIT) (“[T]here has evolved a pattern which, in practice,
discriminates against one class of patentholders by insuring that they will not receive the
benefits of the full 17-year patent life which is available to other patentholders”); S. REP. NO.
97-138, at 28 (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, Acting Deputy Secretary of Commerce)
(“The inequity to certain sectors of our industry, whose inventions are denied a full patent
term due to Federal premarketing approval requirements, has been widely recognized.”).
151
E.g., Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 353–67 (1981) (statement
of Lewis Engman).
152
PELTZMAN, supra note 66, at 13–16.
153
Id. at 13. Peltzman focused on the rate of new chemical entity introductions rather
than the rate of application submissions. This is common in empirical accounts of innovation.
The FDA approves most new chemical entity applications; attrition typically occurs before a
company submits its marketing application, for instance because of failure in phase 2 or phase
3 trials. Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 78–79.
154
HENRY GRABOWSKI, DRUG REGULATION AND INNOVATION: EMPIRAL EVIDENCE AND
POLICY OPTIONS 17–18 (1976).
155
Compare Henry Grabowski, John Vernon, & Lacy Thomas, Estimating the Effects of
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were considering the effective patent life problem, a substantial body of
empirical literature verified the decline.156
Professor Peltzman’s analysis showed that the new regulatory regime
had reduced the annual flow of new drugs by about sixty percent.157 The
Commissioner of Food and Drugs suggested in 1978 that this reflected
rejection of ineffective drugs that would have reached the market under the
pre-1962 law.158 Efficacy had always been a part of premarket review,
however, even when it was not a formal statutory requirement. 159 And
Peltzman found that the 1962 amendments had little impact on the incidence
of ineffective drugs in the market.160 He concluded that the marketplace
before 1962 had imposed adequate penalties on sellers of ineffective
drugs.161 Professor Wiggins brought the data forward in 1981, finding that
regulation had reduced new drug introduction rates in the 1970s by roughly
sixty percent.162
Some economists criticized Peltzman’s work—for instance, because he
failed to account for a downward trend in innovation in the late 1950s,163 or
because his model did not include supply-side factors relating to the

Regulation on Innovation: An International Comparative Analysis of the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 21 J.L. & ECON. 133, 137 (1978) (quoting 1974 speech of Commissioner Schmidt
that “[t]he rate of development and marketing of truly important, significant, and unique
therapeutic entities in this country has remained relatively stable for the past 22 years”), with
Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74, Part 1: Hearings on S. 3441 and S.
966 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd Cong.,
272 (1973-74) [hereinafter Examination of Industry] (statement of Comm’r Schmidt) (noting
“declining number of new single entity drugs approved in the U.S.” and other countries).
156
E.g., Leonard G. Schifrin & Jack R. Tayan, The Drug Lag: An Interpretive Review of
the Literature, 7 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 359, 371 (1977) (reviewing evidence, finding “a
considerable possibility that a drug lag exists,” and noting that “both economic and medical
analyses indicate that by delaying, occasionally for long periods, the availability of most new
drugs, we have also denied their benefits to patients”).
157
PELTZMAN, supra note 66, at 19.
158
Donald Kennedy, A Calm Look at the “Drug Lag,” 239 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 423, 425
(1978) (noting that better understanding of pharmacokinetics, analytical toxicology, and the
need to test for carcinogenic, mutagenic, and teratogenic effects leads to more extensive and
longer-term safety testing before market approval, which results in a longer premarket
program and some drug rejections).
159
Lietzan, Innovation Paradox, supra note 42, at 49–50.
160
PELTZMAN, supra note 66, at 45, 48.
161
Id. at 48. In his view, the primary benefit of the 1962 law derived from the fact that
mandatory premarket testing revealed a drug’s toxic effects before market entry. Id. at 31.
Previously drug companies had borne a small proportion of the consumer cost for unusually
harmful drugs, leading to over-production of those drugs. Id. at 52.
162
Steven N. Wiggins, Product Quality Regulation and New Drug Introductions: Some
Evidence from the 1970s, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 615, 617, 619 (1981). A literature review
in the early 1980s reached the same conclusion. JOHN W. EGAN ET AL., ECONOMICS OF THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 133 (1982).
163
E.g., Schifrin, supra note 80, at 94.
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depletion of scientific knowledge.164 For instance, the FDA contended that
researchers had already identified many important therapeutic agents; the
“gaps” in knowledge had thus decreased and further “opportunities” had
declined.165 In the late 1970s Professor Grabowski investigated the role of
research depletion empirically, comparing new drug innovation in the United
States with new drug innovation in the United Kingdom. This study
confirmed that depletion of opportunities played a role but also found that
U.S. regulatory requirements played a significant role.166
Supporters of patent term restoration attributed the decline in
innovation to the increased time and cost to market that resulted from
evolution in the premarket paradigm. In other words, the additional testing
requirements increased the cost of bringing an invention to market and
delayed commercialization, and the delay shortened the effective patent life
during which the inventor could recover the now-increased investment. A
Merck executive explained this in April 1981. The patent is the
“predominant incentive” for pharmaceutical research and development.”167
Indeed, “[t]he research budget authorized by Merck’s Board of Directors is
directly related to the rewards dependent upon our patent system.”168 The
company was “becoming much more sensitive to the years likely to remain
on the patent when a candidate for development is finally ready to be
marketed.”169 Thus, if all other considerations were equal, “a development
candidate which may take an inordinate amount of development time, with
a resultant loss of effective patent life, is going to be less attractive than one
with a shorter projected development period.”170 At Merck, “[a] patent term
that is reduced by seven or more years is not a sufficiently strong investment
164

E.g., GRABOWSKI, DRUG REGULATION, supra note 154, at 28.
Examination of Industry, supra note 155, at 272; see also Kennedy, supra note 158, at
424 (arguing that the “wave of miracle drugs” in the 1940s and 1950s was not followed by a
second wave “comprising drugs that can treat with the same degree of effectiveness”
conditions such as cancer, arthritis, and cardiovascular disease, perhaps because of an
“apparent exhaustion of certain basic knowledge in which the industry’s earlier breakthroughs
were based”).
166
Grabowski, Vernon, & Thomas, supra note 155. The authors found a significant
decline in the number of new chemical entities discovered and introduced (per effective
research and development dollar) in both countries after 1962, suggesting at least some
decline in the United States stemmed from factors other than U.S. regulatory requirements.
But it also found a six-fold productivity decline in the United States, compared to a three-fold
decline in the United Kingdom, between 1960 to 1961, and 1966 to 1970. A regression
analysis showed that U.S. regulatory requirements had a statistically significant and
quantitatively important effect.
167
Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 321 (1981) (statement of Dr.
Lewis H. Sarett).
168
Id. at 322.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 322–23.
165
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incentive for a management concerned about the increasing costs of
R&D.”171 In response to a question from Representative Thomas J. Bliley
(R-VA), the witness identified research programs Merck had dropped
because of shortened effective patent life: treatments for cystic fibrosis,
myasthenia gravis, and emphysema.172
The push for patent term restoration drew support from the new Reagan
Administration and research universities. The Reagan transition team’s
Health Policy Advisory Group endorsed patent term restoration for new
drugs in November 1980.173 After Reagan took office in January 1981, his
Secretary of Commerce established an intellectual property committee,
chaired by the new Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Gerald
Mossinghoff, which similarly urged patent term restoration.174 The General
Accounting Office (GAO) took a similar position, reporting in 1981 that the
average effective patent life for new drugs was roughly ten years, and that
these drugs needed twelve to nineteen years to break even and earn a
competitive return on capital.175 Research and development expenditures in
the pharmaceutical industry are sensitive to expected returns and cash flow,
it added, and patent term restoration would have “positive impacts on
both.”176 At hearings, university witnesses added that patent term restoration
would benefit university patent holders, who need to attract industrial
licensees to transfer technology invented on campuses.177 Throughout the
legislative process, supporters also had a powerful ally in the FDA.178 As far
171

Id. at 323.
Id. at 340; see also Lewis H. Sarett, FDA Regulations and Their Influence on Future
R&D, 17 RES. MGMT. 18 (1974).
173
Memorandum to William J. Casey et al., Report of the Chairman of the Health Policy
Advisory Group to President-elect Ronald Reagan (Nov. 14, 1980), William J. Casey Papers,
Box 299, Folder 11, Hoover Institution Archives, at 17 (“It is apparent that under existing
legislation and regulation new drug research has diminished drastically within our own
country. Legislation is needed . . . to . . . [e]xtend the patent life of pharmaceuticals to match
the time lost in delays involved in obtaining FDA marketing approval.”); see also Marilou
Sturges, Cut! Chop! Energize!, 1 PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE 21 (1981); Morton Mintz,
Laxalt, Reagan Advisers Differ on Drug Cost Plan, WASH. POST. (Dec. 1, 1980),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/12/01/laxalt-reagan-advisers-differon-drug-cost-plan/203bc473-8a68-4db3-865c838be1f0b285/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ad7e9eb111e1
174
Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 188.
175
GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT TO SENATOR MATHIAS (1981), as reprinted in COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981, S. REP. NO. 97-138, at 11
(1981).
176
Id.
177
The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 61–67 (1981) (statements of Arthur Smith, MIT, and Edwin Yates,
Johns Hopkins University).
178
Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 343 (1981) (statement of
172
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as the agency was concerned, “innovators typically lose years of patent
exclusivity because of testing requirements and regulatory review.”179
Concerned about “the paradox that the careful and time-consuming scientific
review needed to confirm safety and effectiveness may be reducing
incentives to develop drugs that come to [the] FDA for review,”180 the
agency supported patent term restoration “as a means of encouraging
research.”181
Following an April 1981 hearing at which supporters made the case for
restoration, the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported the
Kastenmeier bill. “The patent has traditionally served as a major incentive
for innovation,” it stated in its report.182 The patent “provides an incentive
for the costly and lengthy work of developing an invention by giving the
inventor a sufficient opportunity to market a new product exclusively.”183
Congress had “selected 17 years as the period which best fulfilled this
objective.”184 The “substantial erosion of the patent term for products
subject to extensive Federal premarketing testing, notification, and review
requirements,” however, “raises the serious question of whether the patent
term continues to play its traditional role of encouraging innovation for these
products.”185 Firms “cannot commit funds to initiate long-term research
projects unless they have reasonable assurances that money will continue to
be available to pay for those projects in later years.”186 Restoration would
benefit downstream competitors; “successful measures to stimulate greater
development and marketing of valuable new drugs will ultimately rebound
to the benefit of companies who bring low-cost generic versions to the public
by enlarging the stream of innovation they exploit.”187

Richard Crout, Director, Bureau of Drugs) (agreeing that there had been “an erosion of the
patent life” for regulatory reasons, and he would “favor” a “solution to the problem,” because
“drugs are valuable commodities” and society needs “the right economic incentives for
research on them”); see also The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 2 (1981) (noting that Secretary Schweiker had
endorsed the objectives of the patent term restoration bill).
179
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on S.2748
Before the Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 18 (1984) (statement of Mark
Novitch, Acting Comm’r of Food & Drugs).
180
Id.
181
Id. at 19.
182
S. REP. NO. 97-138, at 6 (1981).
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 7.
187
Id. at 9.

LIETZAN (DO NOT DELETE)

82

11/28/2018 1:51 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:53

Although incentive arguments dominated the policy discussion,
arguments about the “fairness” of providing compensation and the need to
ensure equal outcomes for all inventors also gave the Kastenmeier proposal
momentum. The Assistant Commissioner of Patents argued that there was
“absolutely no reason” why pharmaceutical companies and other companies
subject to premarket requirements “should receive patents with a shorter
effective patent life than is available to other industries.”188 These
sentiments informed legislative support at this stage as well. Representative
Waxman commented, for instance, that “seventeen years is . . . the amount
of time we say it is fair to have exclusive rights as the result of research and
development not only in drugs but in all other areas.”189 The Senate Judiciary
Committee report commented that “[t]here is no valid reason for a better
mousetrap to receive 17 years of patent protection and a lifesaving drug less
than ten years.”190 Patent term restoration would “remedy” a “simple but
serious inequity in the patent system.”191
Support for the Kastenmeier proposals on both grounds was bipartisan
in Congress, and the major newspapers endorsed restoration, citing both
rationales.192 Even the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
agreed.193 The Senate passed the Kastenmeier bill in July 1981 and referred
the proposal to the House Committee on the Judiciary, which was already
reviewing the companion bill in the House. A subcommittee of the House
188

The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 37 (1981) (statement of Rene D. Tegtmeyer, Acting Comm’r of Patents
and Trademarks).
189
Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 368 (1981).
190
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981, S. REP. NO.
97-138, at 2 (1981).
191
Id. at 1.
192
Extending Patents on New Drugs, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 15, 1982 (“[A]rguments by
consumer groups fail to take into account a number of important points . . . . Consumers—
and taxpayers who now pay such a big portion of medical bills—will benefit enormously from
the development of new medications. Extending the life of patents will encourage drug
companies to invest more in research and make more effective new medications possible.”);
Long Life to Patents, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1981 (“There is a simple way to help restore R&D
incentive to the drug industry: guarantee the full 17-year protection by starting the patent
clock ticking after FDA approval, not before.”); Patently Fair, WASH. POST., May 20, 1981
(“But there are strong[] arguments in favor of patent life assurance. One is simple fairness.
If 17 years is the right period for protecting the exclusive rights of inventors, there is no reason
why those subject to federal regulation should be denied it solely by reason of that
regulation.”); The Half-Life Patents, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1981 (“The system discriminates
unfairly against some of the most important research-based industries.”).
193
E.g., The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 291–92 (1981) (statement of the National Retired Teachers
Association and the American Association of Retired Persons) (“We therefore can support S.
255’s restoration of the patent grant for the period of time—not to exceed seven years—that
nonpatent regulatory requirements prevent the marketing of a potential product.”).
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Judiciary Committee considered both bills through the fall and early winter
of 1981.
3. Emergence of Opposition in the Winter of 1981-1982
Opposition to patent term restoration grew over the winter of 1981,
fueled by the generic drug industry’s new lobbying group, the Generic
Pharmaceutical Industry Association (GPIA) and supported by its allies in
the private and public sectors.194 In the legislature, the generic companies
had strong support from Representatives Waxman and Gore (D-TN), as well
as Senator Metzenbaum (D-OH), among others. Chief among the private
sector allies was Public Citizen, with supporting roles played by labor and
groups representing senior citizens. Ralph Nader had founded Public Citizen
in 1971 with the mission of protecting health, safety, and democracy. Sidney
Wolfe had joined Public Citizen the same year and directed the Health
Research Group, devoted to pressing for health-related legal reforms. Public
Citizen, and Sidney Wolfe in particular, were deeply engaged in the battle
against patent term restoration from the earliest days.
Opponents of patent term restoration made a variety of arguments at
this stage, most of which they continued to make until enactment of the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments in the fall of 1984. William Schultz, speaking
on behalf of Public Citizen, argued from the very beginning that effective
patent life should be shorter, rather than longer.195 Others were more
temperate, conceding the incentive role of the patent but questioning the
economic justification put forward for restoration.196 The AARP commented
in 1981 that the “equity argument” was “reasonable” and “warrants
consideration,” but it was not “as convinced by the arguments based on
economic disincentives.”197 The generic industry, in particular, questioned
the empirical support for the proposals. William Haddad, then a member of
the board of the newly formed Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association,
told Congress “we favor patent protection, but the case has yet to be made
194
Judee Shuler, Bill Haddad, 6 PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE 24, 27 (1986) (“The fight
solidified GPIA.”)
195
The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 402–05 (1981) (statements of William B. Schultz, Attorney, Public
Citizens Litigation Group, Accompanied by Benjamin Gordon, Staff Economist; and Fred
Wegner, Pharmaceutical Specialist, American Association of Retired Persons and National
Retired Teachers Association).
196
E.g., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981, S.
REP. NO. 97-138, at 63 (1981) (statement of William Haddad, President, GPIA) (“Research
has not declined; innovation has not declined; patent life has not been cut in half.”).
197
The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 418 (1981) (statement of Fred Wegner, Pharmaceutical Specialist,
Specialist, American Association of Retired Persons and National Retired Teachers
Association).
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that the industry is not getting this protection.”198 If the innovators “make
their case that delay requires additional patent life, [then] they should have
additional life, but to date they have not made their case.”199 The
association’s outside counsel questioned the relevance of declining effective
patent life, arguing that it did not correspond with declining exclusivity in
the market.200 The association argued that “actual average exclusive market
life” for the 100 most widely used drugs ranged from sixteen to 18.5 years,
largely because of patents on the product and method of use.201
This is an important point, but it needs historical context. Once the
compound patent expired, a generic firm could market the compound.
Nothing required it to pursue the same route of administration, dosage form,
strength, or use.202 And nothing required it to use the same manufacturing
process. While many newer drugs may have enjoyed sixteen to eighteen and
a half years on the market before another company introduced the same
active ingredient in a competing product, this generally reflected business
decisions made by individual generic companies. In part, this may have been
because the applications were expensive to prepare. At the time, generic
companies had to file the same kind of application as innovators filed.203
That is, generic companies filed full new drug applications (“NDAs”), with
the results of their own clinical trials, which cost millions of dollars to
prepare. At least 100 newer drugs were off patent and lacked generic
competition simply because generic companies would not invest in full
clinical programs.204

198

The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 434 (1981) (statement of William Haddad).
199
Id. See also Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and
H.R. 1097 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong. 51 (1983) (statement of Haddad) (“[I]f patent life has been retarded
by Government regulations, it should be restored,” but the patent owners have not provided
information to “prove” that case).
200
Alfred Engelberg, Patent Term Extension: An Overreaching Solution to a Nonexistent
Problem, 1 HEALTH AFFS. 34, 41 (1982).
201
Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 Before
the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 49
(1983) (statement of Kenneth Larsen, chair, GPIA); see also Innovation and Patent Law
Reform: Hearings on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286 and H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 413, 420
(1984) [hereinafter Innovation and Patent Law Reform].
202
It might prefer to introduce an identical copy, however, to take advantage of the new
automatic substitution laws. These had not been enacted in every state. Henry Grabowski &
John Vernon, Substitution Laws and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1979).
203
See infra Section III.B.
204
Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 187.
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Opponents of patent term restoration also questioned the connection
between federal regulation and declining effective patent life, suggesting that
drug firms would perform the research anyway. For instance, Senators
Theodore Kennedy (D-MA) and Metzenbaum commented in 1981 that
manufacturers “by their own admission engage in substantial testing of
safety and efficacy to protect themselves against product liability and
consumer fraud suits.”205 Alfred Engelberg, who represented the generic
industry association in the legislative process, added in an article that
the true length of government-caused delay is, in fact, no greater
than the difference between the date on which a reasonably
prudent businessman, subject to product liability claims, would
commercially release a product and the date on which the
government commercially releases the product by approval of a
new drug application.206
These arguments would be made throughout the legislative debate.
Senator Metzenbaum commented in 1983, for instance, that “[a]ny
responsible firm would do tests to make sure that its products are safe and
effective.”207
Professor Peltzman’s study had shown, however, that the research
required by the FDA was more than the companies would do on their own.208
The PTO, which consistently supported patent term restoration, responded
directly to this criticism in 1983. Every year, the Commissioner of Patents
reported that patent owners sought private relief from the legislature because
they could not bring their invention to the market for one reason or
another.209 He explained that the Administration generally opposed relief for
commercialization delays.210 “[T]he patent system is kind of a fail-safe
system itself,” he commented, and “the people who enter it take the chance
that, for one reason or another, they may not be able to achieve the full
seventeen years.”211 The drug and agricultural chemical industries, however,
205
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981, S. REP. NO.
97-138, at 22 (1981) (additional views of Sens. Kennedy & Metzenbaum).
206
Engelberg, supra note 200, at 35.
207
The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 13 (1983); see id. at
44; see also COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1982, H.R REP.
NO. 97-696, at 22 (1982) (dissenting views of Rep. Frank) (“Surely it is not equitable to expect
the elderly and ill, who are often already in severe financial straits, to pay the price for patent
extension, especially where the extension is not even necessary in order to promote the
development of new drugs.”).
208
See supra Section III.A.2.
209
The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 27 (1983) (statement
of Gerald Mossinghoff).
210
Id.
211
Id.
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were “a classic exception to that.”212 While any inventor might perform
modest testing, most of the premarket research and development program
was required instead by federal regulations.213
Opponents made a related argument that restoring patents might not
prompt more innovation.214 In 1981, the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA), responding to an inquiry from
Representative Waxman, wrote that restoration would “enhance” innovation
incentives,215 but the Office could not guarantee that innovation would
increase.216 Restoration might just “compensate” patent owners for research
they would have done anyway.217 Representative Gore complained in 1982
that patent term restoration would increase prescription drug prices “without
any assurances whatever that any of the extra revenue derived would be
reinvested in pharmaceutical R&D.”218 When this argument was raised in
1983, the Commissioner of Patents similarly could not “guarantee” that
restoration would lead to breakthroughs.
There was, however, a
“demonstrable period of time” during which marketing of drugs was
“delayed beyond what most other inventions are.”219 Moreover, “throughout
the many years of its existence, our patent system has encouraged innovation
through the incentives it provides.”220 And “[a]s these incentives are
diminished, so is the encouragement which the patent system might
otherwise have provided.”221
Opponents also made two significant arguments about drug patenting
practices, which—despite credible responses from supporters of
restoration—had enough traction to prompt changes to the Kastenmeier
drafts.

212

Id.
Id. at 25.
214
Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 340 (1981) (“[W]hat evidence
do we have that restoring or lengthening the patent term would reduce the decline in
innovation?”); id. at 333 (“If we have patent term restoration legislation enacted, would Merck
increase its research and development budget . . . by investing additional revenues in research
and development?”).
215
U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PATENT-TERM EXTENSION AND THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 45 (1981) [hereinafter OTA Report].
216
Id. at 4.
217
Id. at 65.
218
Al Gore, Jr., Patent Term Extension: An Expensive and Unnecessary Giveaway, 1
HEALTH AFFS. 25, 32 (1982).
219
The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 17 (1983); id. at 22.
220
Innovation and Patent Law Reform, supra note 201, at 47.
221
Id.
213

LIETZAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

11/28/2018 1:51 PM

HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS

87

First, they argued that drug inventors filed patents earlier than
necessary, so that the shortened effective patent life was the inventors’ own
fault.222 For instance, Representative Gore described a strong negative
relationship between effective patent life and the period between patent filing
and clinical trials.223 He inferred that companies delayed clinical testing,
which, he argued, should “end the debate over patent term extension.”224
The relationship between the preclinical period and shortened effective
patent life was well known. Eisman and Wardell had confirmed that onequarter of the erosion of patent life was attributable to an increase in the time
between patent filing and start of clinical trials.225 Proponents of restoration
simply disagreed about the significance of this finding.226 The regulatory
framework requires a company to perform preclinical testing sufficient to
support an application to conduct human trials. This testing differs from,
and is more extensive than, the testing needed to establish utility of a
compound for patenting purposes. Patent owners viewed the lengthening
gap between patent filings and clinical trials as a function of preclinical
regulatory requirements becoming more complex and time consuming in the
1960s and 1970s.227
Second, opponents argued that drug inventors filed continuation
applications to delay issuance, and thus patent expiry, which meant that the
effective patent life was not so short after all.228 Patent owners responded

222

E.g., OTA Report, supra note 215, at 66.
Gore, supra note 218, at 30.
224
Id.
225
Eisman & Wardell, supra note 80, at 20.
226
E.g., Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097
Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong. 129 (1983) (statement of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) that the
increase in regulatory requirements included preclinical research which can consume as many
as four years).
227
Before the 1960s, for instance, the FDA did not require nonclinical toxicology testing
before human trials. 21 C.F.R. § 130.3 (1956). After 1963, the agency required the results
of pharmacology and toxicology studies sufficient in kind, duration, and scope to show that it
was reasonably safe to conduct a first-in-humans test and that the described trials would assure
the safety and rights of the trial subjects. New Drugs, 28 Fed. Reg. 179 (Jan. 8, 1963) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130) (requiring investigational new applications to contain results of
preclinical testing); Robert Temple, Development of Drug Law, Regulations, and Guidance
in the United States, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF DRUGS 1645 (1994) (noting that in the
1960s the FDA settled on the animal toxicity studies needed to justify human testing);
Nonclinical Laboratory Studies, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,986 (Dec. 22, 1978) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 58) (adding good laboratory practice regulations to ensure scientific integrity and
validity of laboratory data). And in the 1970s, the FDA published its first laboratory practices
regulations, imposing substantial new requirements on all aspects of the planning, conduct,
and reporting of preclinical studies, as well as inspection and disqualification of testing
facilities. Id. at 59,986, 59,990, 60,013–25.
228
E.g., Engelberg, supra note 200, at 39.
223
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that this misunderstood how drug discovery and approval work. Sometimes
an initial discovery leads to a broad genus claim, following which the firm
studies the entire family to identify new compounds within the family that
are more likely to result in a finished product that can be brought through the
regulatory process. The firm then prosecutes the individual compounds in
continuing applications. In the summer of 1984, when opponents continued
to make these arguments, an executive testifying for American Home
Products offered an example.229 The Squibb Corporation had patented the
genus of 9-halosteroids and then developed two topical steroid products from
the genus: Kenalog (triamcinolone acetonide) and Halog (halcinonide).230
Prohibiting restoration of the patent claiming the novel active ingredient of
the distinct drug product Kenalog—that is, requiring the firm to restore the
earlier genus patent instead—would be inconsistent with the basic point of
restoring patents compromised by regulatory requirements.231 Even though
it had discovered the steroid class, the firm could not commercialize the
invention of triamcinolone acetonide until it developed a finished product
(formulation of triamcinolone acetonide and appropriate inactive
ingredients, route of administration, dosage form, and strength), ran that
product through the premarket regulatory paradigm, and substantiated
specific claims about that product for the regulatory labeling.232 While the
patents might be linked, the regulatory requirements for a triamcinolone
acetonide product would not be different or less burdensome simply because
the firm had earlier discovered the genus.
Objections to continuations must also be placed in historical context.
Before Congress changed the patent term in 1995, continuation patents could
mitigate the truncation of patent life from testing requirements. That is, a
continuation slowed issuance of the patent, and if the patent issued later, it
expired later. Even under the restoration proposals, however, a continuation
patent could never have an effective patent life exceeding the nominal
statutory term of 17 years. Although the restoration days would be added to
a later expiry date, less of the patent term would have been lost to testing, so
the company would receive fewer days in restoration.233 In 1981, OTA
229

Innovation and Patent Law Reform, supra note 201, at 438–39 (statement of John R.
Stafford).
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
See supra Section II.A.
233
For instance, suppose clinical trials for a new drug began in 1986, and suppose the
FDA approved the drug in 1996. Consider a patent that issued on the day that trials started,
in 1986. Before restoration this patent would expire in 2003. If the PTO restored all of the
patent life consumed by testing, it would restore ten years, and the patent would expire in
2013. The new drug would therefore have a seventeen-year effective patent life, from 1996
to 2013. Now consider a patent that issued two years before FDA approval, thus in 1994.
Before restoration this patent would expire in 2011. If the PTO restored all of the patent life
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recommended a cap on restoration measured from the date of filing the first
patent application, in order to eliminate the benefit from filing continuation
patents, or “extensions of long duration.”234 But as a mathematical matter,
the effective patent life could never exceed seventeen years.235 So by
“extensions of long duration,” OTA necessarily meant simply “extensions
that lead to 17 years of effective patent life.” The objection to use of
continuations thus reflected a rejection of a basic goal of the proponents of
patent term restoration: ensuring comparable patent terms for regulated
patent owners.
4. House Vote on the Proposal
In May 1982, Representative Kastenmeier introduced revised
language.236 As before, the proposal would restore up to seven years of
patent life lost to testing and agency review.237 At the urging of generic
companies and Public Citizen, however, the bill included provisions to
penalize patent owners for long intervals between patent filings and clinical
trials and to discourage continuation applications.238
First, a patent owner would receive all of the regulatory review period
after patent issuance until ten years after the earliest relevant patent
application, but only half of the regulatory review period from years ten to
twenty after the patent application.239 Second, the extended patent term
could not expire more than twenty-seven years after the earliest patent
application.240 Judge Lourie—then at SmithKline and chairing the patent
policy committee of the innovative industry’s trade association,
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (PMA)—explained the number
shortly after enactment.241 The PTO took an average of three years to process
a patent application, Judge Lourie wrote, and the remaining premarket
consumed by testing, it would restore two years, and the patent would expire in 2013. The
new drug would again have a seventeen-year effective patent life, from 1996 to 2013. It could
never have a longer effective patent life.
234
OTA Report, supra note 215, at 66.
235
See supra note 233.
236
The subcommittee considering the bill held a markup in March and forwarded the
revised language to the full committee in May in the form of a clean bill with a new number.
H.R. 6444, 97th Cong. (2d Sess. 1982).
237
Id. at 3 (proposing 35 U.S.C. § 155(a)(2)(B)).
238
See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1982, H.R REP.
NO. 97-696, at 8 (1982) (“This amendment was designed to encourage companies to file and
process U.S. patent applications expeditiously and to complete regulatory related testing as
rapidly as possible.”); id. at 7 (explaining that these changes responded to criticisms from the
generic industry and Public Citizen).
239
H.R. 6444, supra note 236, at 2 (proposing that 35 U.S.C. § 155(a)(1) be amended to
make the regulatory review period last from the start of clinical trials until FDA approval).
240
Id. at 3 (proposing 35 U.S.C. § 155(a)(2)(B)).
241
Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 530.
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process averaged seven more years.242 The twenty-seven-year limit would
allow the average experience to result in seventeen years of effective patent
life.243
But the new approach meant that some companies would be unable to
secure seventeen years of effective patent life for their drugs. If regulatory
requirements led to a lengthy preclinical or clinical program, and the FDA
approved the product more than ten years after the inventor filed his patent
application, the company could no longer use a later-expiring continuation
patent to secure seventeen years of effective patent life.244 Under earlier
proposals and the Senate’s language, a continuation patent that issued in the
final seven years before this drug’s approval could enjoy a seventeen-year
term after its lost years were restored.245 This was no longer possible. This
bill also limited a company to one patent per regulatory review period,
meaning, effectively, one patent per product.246 PTO did not object to
capping the restoration of continuation patents, but it objected strenuously to
limiting the patents eligible for restoration.247
The House considered the bill through the summer of 1982.248 Public
support was strong and included physician organizations (such as the
American Academy of Dermatology, the American College of Cardiology,
and the AMA), volunteer organizations devoted to improving health (such
as the American Heart Association), academic institutions (such as Johns
Hopkins University), medical schools and treatment centers (such as the
University of Cincinnati Medical Center and the University of Wisconsin
Medical School), government agencies (for instance, the EPA and FDA), and
pharmacies (the National Association of Chain Drug Store), and wholesalers
(the National Wholesale Druggists Association).249 Supporters of the bill
placed the bill on the suspension calendar.250 In this scenario, a series of
noncontroversial bills are bundled together for vote, and the time for debate
242

Id.
Id.
244
Again, the bill would have required the patent to expire twenty-seven years after the
earliest application. If the FDA approved the product ten years after the patent application,
the company would have seventeen years of effective patent life (as twenty-seven minus ten).
If the approval process took longer, the company would have fewer years.
245
These bills did not impose a twenty-seven year limit. They did impose a seven-year
cap. E.g., S. 255, 97th Cong. § 155(a)(2) (1981). If a patent issued in the final seven years
before approval, the patent owner would receive back all of the years lost to the preapproval
process. It would, therefore, enjoy its full 17-year statutory term.
246
H.R. 6444, supra note 236 (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 155(a)(2)(C)).
247
See Innovation and Patent Law Reform, supra note 201, at 388–89.
248
See H.R. 6444, 97th Cong. (reported with amendments Aug. 4, 1982).
249
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1982, H.R REP. NO.
97-696, at 8–9 (1982).
250
Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 188; Interview with Bill Corr (Mar. 29, 2018).
243
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of each bill is limited.251 A two-thirds majority must vote to suspend the
rules and pass the bill by voice vote.252 If a bill fails to receive two-thirds
support, it returns to the House Rules Committee and is put through the
regular committee process.253 Placement on the suspension calendar
presumably reflected the fact that the Kastenmeier bill had strong bipartisan
support and belief that the main objections from the prior winter had been
addressed.
On September 15, a majority of the House voted for passage. But the
bill fell five votes short of the supermajority needed.254 Explanations vary.
One account reports heavy fog at airports in the East and Midwest that
delayed several members who would have supported the bill.255 Another
explains that Representatives Gore and Waxman worked the floor
extensively on the day of the vote in order to defeat passage.256 Both
explanations could be true.
B. Generic Industry Policymaking Defeats
During these same years, the generic companies experienced a series of
policymaking defeats that propelled them to organize and push for
legislation advancing their own interests. These companies had marketed
generic drugs since the 1930s. Many marketed generic drugs based on full
applications containing clinical research, but, until the early 1980s, there
were also two possibilities for market entry without research. Developments
at the FDA and in the courts in the 1970s through the early 1980s foreclosed
these possibilities. In the summer of 1983, Representative Waxman
introduced legislation that would allow generic companies to reach the
market earlier and on the basis of applications omitting clinical data. While
patent term restoration legislation would have lengthened effective patent
life, this legislation would shorten exclusivity in the marketplace for
patented drugs. The arguments against patent term restoration became
251
Christopher M. Davis, How Measures Are Brought to the House Floor: A Brief
Introduction, CONG. RES. SERV. (Sept. 16, 2005), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20067.pdf.
252
Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 188.
253
Id.
254
Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 532.
255
Although it proved challenging to verify the fog or flight delays, the fifty members of
the House who did not vote included one of the bill’s five sponsors, Jack Brooks (D-TX), as
well as a half dozen Republicans from states on the East Coast and in the Midwest. See 128
CONG. REC. 23656-57 (Sept. 15, 1982) (e.g., Lyle Williams, Elwood Hillis, Thomas Hartnett,
Ed Bethune, and Skip Bafalis). At the same time, as Bill Schultz has pointed out to me, had
the bill failed only because five supporting votes were delayed by weather, supporters could
have brought the bill up for a new vote a few days later. Email from William B. Schultz to
Erika Lietzan (May 12, 2018).
256
Interview with Bill Corr (Mar. 29, 2018); Representative Henry Waxman, Author of
the Hatch-Waxman Act, CLAUSE 8 21:44–23:18 (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.clause8.tv/.
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arguments for the generic drug pathway. From this moment forward, the
generic companies and their allies dominated the policymaking process, and
the Kastenmeier proposal never had another meaningful chance of passage.
1. Potential Pathways for Generic Drugs
Understanding why the generic companies mobilized suddenly on their
own behalf in 1983 requires a description of the policymaking defeats in the
1970s and early 1980s, which in turn requires understanding the two possible
pathways to market without safety and effectiveness data that evaporated in
the early 1980s.
i.

Two Pathways for Copies of Pre-1962 Drugs

The FDCA requires NDAs only for “new drugs.”257 From 1938 to
1962, generic drugs reached the market without applications, on the theory
that they were not new drugs in the first place. Thus, after one company
brought a new drug to market under an NDA, other companies launched
copies without submitting applications. Some concluded that the underlying
drug was “generally recognized as safe” (thus, not a “new drug”) because of
the NDA.258 Others relied on written opinions from the FDA, known as “old
drug opinions.”259 After Congress amended the FDCA in 1962 to add an
effectiveness requirement, the FDA withdrew these opinions.260 But the
statute still excluded not-new drugs from the NDA requirement. So the FDA
decided to use rulemaking to determine which drugs were exempt.261 The
agency never finalized the proposal, however, because it was concerned
about losing regulatory control over drugs that it exempted.262
Instead, it used rulemaking to develop an “abbreviated new drug
application” (ANDA) pathway.263 An ANDA would contain information

21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1938). From 1938 to 1962, “new drug” meant any drug not
“generally recognized . . . as safe” under the conditions described in its labeling. 21 U.S.C. §
321(p) (1938). Since 1962 it has meant a drug that is not generally recognized as safe and
effective under these conditions. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1962). It also means a drug that is
generally recognized as safe and effective but that has not been marketed to a material extent
and for a material time under the conditions in its labeling. Id.
258
PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LA: CASES AND MATERIALS 775–76 (4th
ed. 2014).
259
Id.
260
New Drugs, 33 Fed. Reg. 7758 (May 28, 1968) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130).
261
Drugs in Finished Dosage Form, 33 Fed. Reg. 7762 (May 28, 1968) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pt. 130).
262
Condition for Marketing Human Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,142, 26,144
(June 20, 1975) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130).
263
Food Additives, 34 Fed. Reg. 2672, 2673 (proposed Feb. 27, 1969) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pt. 121); New Drugs, 35 Fed. Reg. 6574 (Apr. 24, 1970) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 130).
257
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about the generic drug and its manufacturing process, and it would include
bioavailability information and any preclinical or clinical data developed by
the applicant relating to adverse effects.264 The application would also
confirm that the drug complied with specifications in an official
compendium or that specifications and testing ensured the drug’s identity,
strength, quality, and purity.265 But unlike an NDA, it would not contain
clinical safety or effectiveness data.
A generic company could file an ANDA to copy a “new drug” that had
been the subject of an NDA before the 1962 amendments, but only after the
FDA reviewed the first drug and confirmed its effectiveness, which the
agency did as part of its implementation of the 1962 amendments.266 The
FDA also expected companies already marketing copies to file ANDAs.267
ii.

Copying Post-1962 Drugs

By 1975, the FDA had received over 6000 ANDAs for copies of pre1962 innovator drugs.268 Also, in the 1970s, patents on post-1962 drugs
began to expire. Generic firms that wanted to market copies could not file
ANDAs, however, because these were reserved for copies of pre-1962 drugs.
The FDA sought to fill the gap with a “paper NDA” pathway, which
permitted generic companies to submit published literature as proof that their
copies were safe and effective.269 But as soon as the agency approved the
first paper NDA, it faced litigation: suits from the innovative industry
arguing, among other things, that the policy was inconsistent with the statute
and, separately, that it required notice and comment rulemaking, as well as
suits from generic companies seeking to compel approval of their paper
NDAs after the agency stayed its policy.270 Ultimately, the agency was
permitted to proceed, but there was rarely enough information in the
264

New Drugs, 35 Fed. Reg. 6574, 6575 (Apr. 24, 1970) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.

130).
265

New Drugs, 35 Fed. Reg. at 6575.
Food Additives, 34 Fed. Reg. 2672, 2673 (proposed Feb. 27, 1969) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pt. 121).
267
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF AND INDUSTRY: MARKETED
UNAPPROVED DRUGS–COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 10 (Sept. 19, 2011), https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianc
eregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm070290.pdf.
268
Condition for Marketing Human Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,142, 26,145
(June 20, 1975) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130).
269
Response to Petition Seeking Withdrawal, 45 Fed. Reg. 82,052 (Dec. 12, 1980)
(announcing and defending policy, and responding to petition asking it to withdraw policy);
Response to Petition Seeking Withdrawal, 45 Fed. Reg. at 82,058 (“paper NDAs are based on
published literature”).
270
Memorandum from Mary Francis Lowe to Mark Novitch (Jan. 23, 1981), reprinted in
Competition in the Drug Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 63–65 (1981).
266
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published literature for a paper NDA strategy to work. This left two
possibilities for generic firms: old drug status or expansion of the ANDA
regulation. Innovators opposed both, on the ground that these policies would
allow generic firms to “free ride” on their original research.271 This, they
argued, would be unprecedented.272 The FDA had treated the safety and
effectiveness data in NDAs as trade secret for decades, refusing to release
the data or allow competitors to rely on them.273
The FDA seriously considered the old drug theory.274 In the agency’s
view, a quartet of Supreme Court rulings in 1973 broadly sustained its
primary jurisdiction to determine the status of drugs.275 In 1974, therefore,
an agency official explained the plan.276 The FDA would publish a
monograph (regulation) specifying the conditions under which a particular
drug could be marketed without premarket approval. The agency would
begin with copies of pre-1962 drugs, but post-1962 drugs would eventually
be covered.277 In June 1975, the FDA promised that the proposal was
imminent.278 The next month, a federal court commented that the FDA
“certainly” had the power to promulgate these regulations.279 Concerned
about the legal arguments raised by innovators, however, the agency never
271
William W. Vodra, The Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978: Putting Some Economic
Issues Into Different Contexts, 1 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 184, 189 (1980).
272
Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 Before
the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong.
126 (1983) (statement of PMA).
273
E.g., Food and Drug Administration, 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,612 (Dec. 24, 1974)
(“The Food and Drug Administration has on numerous occasions testified before Congress
that current statutory prohibitions prevent disclosure of useful information contained in the
agency’s files, and, particularly, data relating to the safety and effectiveness of drugs.”); Food
and Drug Administration, 39 Fed. Reg. at 44,634 (“The Commissioner advises that, since
1938, it has been the consistent administrative interpretation that [section 301(j), which refers
to trade secrets] can encompass animal and human data[.]”); id. at 44,635 (“[T]he
Commissioner concludes that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1905 and the trade secrets
exemption to the Freedom of Information Act are clearly applicable to such data.”).
274
Condition for Marketing Human Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,142, 26,146
(June 20, 1975) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130).
275
Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973), Ciba Corp. v.
Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973), Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973),
USV Pharm. Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655 (1973); Condition for Marketing Human
Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,142, 26,146 (June 20, 1975) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 130) (explaining the FDA’s interpretation of the rulings).
276
Mary A. McEniry, Drug Monographs, 29 FOOD DRUG COSM L.J. 166 (1974).
277
Id. at 168–70.
278
See Condition for Marketing Human Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,142, 26,146
(June 20, 1975) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130) (noting that the FDA decided “to proceed
with the development of an old drug monograph system for regulating human prescription
drugs” and stating that the FDA “anticipates that these regulations will be published as a
proposal in the near future”).
279
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Weinberger, 425 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.D.C. 1975).
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published the proposal. Instead it proposed legislation authorizing the
creation of drug monographs, which would effectively exempt generic drugs
from the NDA requirement.280
The FDA also considered permitting ANDAs for copies of post-1962
drugs. Indeed, in 1978, it announced it would draft regulations permitting
these ANDAs.281 Draft regulations were leaked to the press in early 1982.282
Under this proposal, applications could be submitted, once the FDA issued
a finding that a particular innovative drug product was “suitable” for
ANDAs.283 These ANDAs would contain the same information as ANDAs
proposing copies of pre-1962 drugs.284 The Bureau of Drugs proposed a
fifteen-year waiting period, to ensure sufficient incentives for innovation,
and it assumed a generic firm would need another two years to perform
testing and secure approval.285 Facing opposition from both sides, the FDA
abandoned the effort.286 Innovators objected to the fact that ANDAs would
280

See Vodra, supra note 271, at 194 (noting that the FDA proposed the legislation).
Under the Drug Regulation Reform Act, a company could petition the FDA to issue a
monograph describing drug products authorized for licensure under the monograph and
specifying the labeling required. For the first five years after monograph publication, consent
of the original NDA holder would have been required for market entry. S. 2755, 95th Cong.
(introduced Mar. 16, 1978); H.R. 11611, 95th Cong. (introduced Mar. 16, 1978). Sen.
Kennedy and Rep. Waxman reintroduced the bill in 1979. S. 1075, 96th Con. (introduced
Oct. 2, 1979); H.R. 4258, 96th Cong. (introduced May 30, 1979). The Senate passed the bill
in October 1979 (with the five-year window changed to seven years. Drug Legislation:
Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 Before the Subcomm. on Health
& the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 113 (1983). But the House
took no action after committee referral.
281
Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 43 Fed. Reg. 39,126, 39,128 (Sept. 1, 1978) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 310 and 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) (announcing plan to “extend the ANDA
concept at a later time to post-1962 drug products by publishing criteria for making such a
determination about these drugs”); see also Abbreviated New Drug Applications for New
Drugs Approved After October 10, 1962, 47 Fed. Reg. 1765, 1767 (Jan. 13, 1982) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) (stating that the FDA would publish a notice of proposed
rulemaking in March 1982 for ANDAs copying drugs approved after October 10, 1962).
282
See Post-1962 ANDA Reg Proposal in the Works Would Build In 15-Year Gap
Between Pioneer Approval Date and Generic Eligibility for ANDA, PINK SHEET, Mar. 8, 1982.
283
Draft Proposed Rule, New Drugs Approved After October 10, 1962, for Human Use:
Proposal to Accept Abbreviated New Drug Applications (Feb. 8, 1982) at 23, 27 (on file with
author).
284
Id. at 30.
285
Id. at 24. Because “a 17-year period coincides with the statutory patent period,” the
Bureau believed “it would provide an adequate period to maintain drug research and
incentives.” Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097
Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong. 118 (1983) (statement of PMA, quoting FDA documents); see also id. at 19 (comments
of Rep. Waxman); id. at 32.
286
Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 Before
the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong.
116–25 (1983) (statement of PMA, quoting FDA documents). Although the FDA abandoned
the effort to extend its ANDA regulation to post-1962 new drugs, the ANDA regulation for
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rely on the data in their applications. Generic firms objected to the waiting
period.287 The Bureau of Drugs submitted the proposed regulations to the
Secretary but the draft went no further.288
2. Developments in 1982 and 1983
The lack of an abbreviated pathway did not mean a lack of generic
competition. Some generic companies filed full applications for copies of
post-1962 drugs. The number of new generic prescriptions filled in 1980
was 6.8% more than it had been in 1979 and 275% more than it had been in
1966.289 Generic drugs comprised 14.7% of all prescriptions filled by 1980,
compared to 6.4% in 1966.290 Various federal agencies worked with the
states to facilitate the cost savings that these generic drugs promised.
Between 1976 and 1979, nearly 80% of the states enacted automatic
substitution laws, which would allow—or in some cases direct—pharmacists
to substitute a less expensive drug product that was therapeutically
equivalent to the prescribed product.291 The FTC and the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare issued a model law in January 1979 to help
the states develop legislation for drug product selection.292 The FDA then
began publishing an annual list of approved drug products and therapeutic
equivalence determinations.293
Generic companies nevertheless continued to argue that once the FDA
approved an NDA, the underlying active ingredient became a not-new drug
that could be marketed by others without premarket approval. By the end of
1981, the courts of appeals were divided on the issue.294 In March 1982, the
Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari in the Fifth
Circuit Generix case, raising the possibility that it would confirm the FDA’s
view that generic drugs require applications.295 During the same month, the
FDA abandoned the idea of expanding its ANDA regulation to permit copies

pre-1962 drugs remained on the books.
287
Id. at 119 (statement of PMA, quoting FDA documents)
288
Id.
289
Top 200 Drugs of 1980, PHARMACY TIMES, April 1981.
290
Id.
291
Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 202, at 43.
292
See Therapeutically Equivalent Drugs, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,582, 72,593 (Oct. 31, 1980)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 20) (describing Model Act).
293
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (ORANGE BOOK) (1st ed. 1980).
294
United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 654 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1981) (agreeing with
generic industry that “new drug” refers to the active ingredient alone); Premo Pharm. Lab.
Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that “new drug” definition applies
to finished products not just active ingredients).
295
United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
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of post-1962 drugs.296 Applications would need full safety and effectiveness
research.
Two additional developments impelled the generic companies to seek
legislative relief. First, in July 1982, a federal court in California ruled that
manufacturing and testing generic doxycycline during the innovator’s patent
term, to obtain FDA approval to market after the patent term, infringed the
patent.297 The court had already found that International Rectifier
Corporation (IRC) infringed Pfizer’s patent on doxycycline by making,
using, and selling generic doxycycline in the United States.298 After the court
issued an injunction, IRC used its infringing doxycycline to make substantial
quantities of infringing products, which it tested for bioequivalence to
Pfizer’s product in order to seek FDA approval.299 When Pfizer asked the
court to hold IRC in contempt, IRC argued that its activities fell within the
common law experimental use privilege.300 In July 1982, the court rejected
the argument.301 Use of infringing doxycycline to manufacture and test
infringing products and submit the resulting data to the FDA was designed
to determine marketability, gain a commercial advantage, and indirectly
promote product sales, so the experimental use privilege did not apply.302
Second, in March 1983 the Supreme Court ruled in Generix, agreeing
with the FDA that generic drugs are new drugs that require approved
applications.303 The statutory inquiry whether a drug is “generally
recognized as safe and effective” (and thus not-new) focuses on the finished
drug product rather than the active ingredient.304 A proposed generic drug
product would therefore be a “new drug” even if the FDA had previously
approved the active ingredient.305 This decision ended the argument that
generic companies could bring copies to market simply by citing approved
products. A group of generic companies sued the FDA in June 1983, seeking
to compel the agency to resume the ANDA rulemaking that it had abandoned
and asking the FDA to approve copies of post-1962 drugs based on
ANDAs.306 Had the agency complied, however, it would have faced suit
296
297

See supra Section III.C.1.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Int’l Rectifier Corp., No. 73-58, 1982 WL 51039 (C.D. Cal. July 20,

1982).
298

Id. at *1.
Id.
300
Id.
301
Id. at *8.
302
Id. at *7.
303
United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453 (1983).
304
Id. at 459.
305
Id. at 460.
306
Complaint, Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Heckler, No. 88-4817 (S.D.N.Y. June
24, 1983). The parties eventually agreed that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments mooted the
case. Stipulation and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice, Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs.,
299
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from innovators.
C. Development and Passage of the Generic Drug Bill
The vote on the Kastenmeier bill occurred in the fall of 1982, between
the ruling in International Rectifier (July 1982) and the ruling in Generix
(March 1983). The generic industry’s chances of reaching the market
without performing clinical trials after patent expiry were thus already
waning. Bill Haddad, by now the president and chief executive officer of
the new generic industry association, began to shift the group’s focus to the
impact of patents and exclusivity on drug prices.307 Haddad was a veteran
on the Hill, having worked for Senator Kefauver during the drug pricing
hearings that preceded the 1962 amendments to the FDCA.308 By early
August, he had persuaded the major papers to reverse their positions and
oppose patent term restoration.309
The more aggressive focus on pricing aligned with arguments that
consumer groups—particularly Public Citizen—had been making all along.
In 1981, for instance, Schultz had recommended compulsory licensing of
drug patents three to five years after new drug approval, arguing that “the
monopoly period is too long, not too short.”310 With the encouragement of
GPIA and Public Citizen, sympathetic members of Congress now focused
on the high profit margin of the pharmaceutical industry.311 This, then, could
Inc. v. Heckler, No. 88-4817 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 7, 1985).
307
CHRISTOPHER SCOTT HARRISON, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL PRICING OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 57–58 (2004) (noting that Haddad’s strategy was to add the price
dimension, which divided the support for patent term restoration).
308
Id. at 57.
309
E.g., An Unwarranted Patent Stretch, N.Y. TIMES: ARCHIVES (Aug. 7, 1982),
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/07/opinion/an-unwarranted-patent-stretch.html
(“Congress has let itself be persuaded, after a hasty review, that the extension is fair and will
foster innovation. But the drug industry’s case is dubious. Its chief premise is that extension
will restore the time unfairly lose from patent life by having to prove to the Government that
new drugs are safe and effective. But the testing of drugs in animal and clinical trials is
something that any responsible company would wish to do anyway.”); Patents and Medicine,
WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1982 (“In fact, there isn’t much evidence that drug research has been
stifled, and there should be no concern over the industry’s profitability. Drug research is
important, but so is encouraging competition and lower prices for consumers.”).
310
Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 406 (1981) (testimony of
Sidney Wolfe and William Schultz).
311
E.g., Gore, supra note 218, at 30; Competition in the Drug Industry: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th
Cong. 8 (1981) (statement of Sidney Wolfe) (“I would estimate that most of these drugs by
the time they come off patent will have yielded their manufacturers hundreds of millions of
dollars, if not, in the case of several of them, billions of dollars in sales by the time they come
off patent. That raises questions to me as to how much more protection of investments is
needed.”); COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981, S. REP.
NO. 97-138, at 21 (1981) (additional views of Sen. Kennedy and Sen. Metzenbaum) (noting
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be another explanation for the failure of the Kastenmeier bill—the generic
industry’s increased sense of urgency about a pathway to market and
Haddad’s aggressive focus on drug prices, which aligned with arguments
Public Citizen had been making. Indeed, Public Citizen now claims credit
for defeat of the Kastenmeier bill, noting on its website that its “lobbying
efforts halt[ed] plans to extend drug manufacturers’ monopolies on their
products by up to seven years.”312
The vote on the Kastenmeier bill in September 1982 was nevertheless
close. The Commissioner of Patents later called the vote “a wake-up call”
for the generic companies.313 They intensified their opposition to patent term
restoration, and subsequent efforts to revive the Kastenmeier approach
failed.314 After the Generix decision in March, they turned to Representative
Waxman for help with a statutory pathway for generic drugs.
Waxman had joined the House in 1975, making it clear that his
priorities were health and environmental issues.315 He had introduced the
FDA’s Drug Regulation Reform Act in 1979 to create a monograph old-drug
system for generic drugs, and he was quick to start the statutory process for
abbreviated NDAs in July 1983.316 His placeholder bill would have added
one sentence to the new drug provision of the FDCA, exempting companies
from the obligation to submit full applications for copies of drugs approved
in the past, provided their abbreviated applications satisfy “appropriate
standards of identity, strength, quality, purity, stability, bioavailability, and
bioequivalence” in relation to the approved drug.317 Over the summer, he
convened a series of hearings in the House that mostly featured witnesses
from or allied with generic companies.318
The discussions that followed, from July 1983 to May 1984, happened
mostly behind closed doors.319 The dynamics are important to understand.
that pharmaceutical companies are “the Nation’s fourth most profitable industry”).
312
Accomplishments, PUB. CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/about/accomplishments/
accomplishments-1885-1980 (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).
313
Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 188.
314
E.g., S. 1306, 98th Cong. (introduced May 17, 1983); H.R. 3502, 98th Cong.
(introduced June 30, 1983).
315
See Waxman, Henry Arnold, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES: UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/People/Listing/W/WAXMAN,-Henry-Arnold(W000215)/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).
316
See supra note 280.
317
H.R. 3605, 98th Cong. (introduced July 19, 1983).
318
E.g., Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097
Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong. 51 (1983).
319
Lewis Engman and Peter Hutt (president of and counsel to PMA, respectively) handled
the discussions for the innovative industry, and William Haddad and Alfred Engelberg
(president of and counsel to GPIA, respectively) represented the generic industry. Lourie,
Account, supra note 24, at 534. Rep. Waxman and his staff were also deeply involved. Much
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Patent owners had lost the vote on patent term restoration, which meant they
could not secure its passage on their own. In addition, patent owners were
seeking a remedy for the loss of their patent term, which meant that any offer
would be better than the status quo, and they had nothing to bargain with—
the only thing they could give, so to speak, was the opposite of what they
sought, that is, exclusivity in the market. Because of the House vote, patent
owners could make no credible threat of tabling the discussion and trying a
more favorable Congress, and because they had nothing to offer, this would
not have been an effective threat in any case. Furthermore, because the
generic companies not only opposed restoration but sought the opposite
outcome—not merely to defeat the push for longer patent life, but actually
to shorten exclusivity in the market—the innovators would do well to cling
to the status quo.
Patent owners and their allies continued to argue at hearings that
restoration would restore incentives to innovate and ensure that regulated
patent owners were not treated differently. Professor Grabowski explained,
for instance, that patent term restoration would restore lost incentives.320
Because patent term restoration “increases the expected returns from new
drug innovation and also provides firms that are successful in new product
introductions with increased profits and cash flow,” he told a Senate
subcommittee, “we would expect it to lead to significant increases in R&D
investments.”321 The Administration remained firmly in support. For
instance, the Deputy Commissioner of Food and Drugs testified in 1983 that
eighteen percent of new drugs had five or fewer years of effective patent life
remaining, and five to seven percent had no patent protection left.322 The
Commissioner of Patents explained that the Administration “recognizes the
need for remedial action to increase innovation” and “strongly” supported
enactment of patent term restoration.323 One inventor “should not be treated
differently from another.”324
of the back-and-forth (especially beginning in January 1984) was leaked to and reported by
the trade press.
320
See The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 130 (1983)
(statement of Henry Grabowski).
321
Id.
322
Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554, H.R. 3605, H.R. 1055 and H.R. 1097 Before
the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong.
13–16 (1983) (statement of Mark Novitch).
323
The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 16 (1983) (statement
of Gerald Mossinghoff).
324
Id. at 17 (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff); see also id. at 17–18 (“Certain sectors of
our industry dealing with technologies which are subject to premarket regulatory review, and
among the most innovative of our industries, are not receiving the full benefit of the patent
system to which they are entitled by virtue of having disclosed their inventions to the
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A federal court ruling in October 1983 strengthened the generic
industry’s hand by permitting generic companies to engage in
experimentation during the patent term.325 Roche Products held a patent for
flurazepam hydrochloride, the active ingredient in Dalmane. Bolar
Pharmaceuticals imported five kilograms from a foreign manufacturer,
intending to produce flurazepam capsules, which it would study for purposes
of submitting its own application. It planned to apply to the FDA before
patent expiry in January 1984, but it would not market the product until after
patent expiry. The trial court ruled that Bolar’s “limited experimental use of
flurazepam” did not infringe Roche’s patent.326 Bolar had persuaded the
court that its use was de minimis and that it would not realize any commercial
benefit before patent expiry.327 If Bolar could not begin the testing process
until after patent expiry, the court commented, Roche would enjoy a de facto
patent extension of several years, which was “not a right or benefit granted
by the patent law.”328
Negotiators agreed in principle in January 1984, but Waxman’s first
full draft—not circulated for comment until April 1984—caught patent
owners off guard with provisions that had not been part of the agreement.329
On April 23, while stakeholders were considering the language, the newly
constituted United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed
the New York ruling.330 Bolar’s manufacture and testing did not fall within
the common law experimental use privilege. While Bolar was indeed
performing experiments, “unlicensed experiments conducted with a view to
the adaption of the patented invention to the experimenter’s business” violate
the patent owner’s right to exclude others from using his invention. Bolar
was not engaged in “scientific inquiry”—it had “definite, cognizable, and
not insubstantial commercial purposes.”331 Although the court of appeals
was sympathetic to complaints that regulatory approval requirements
effectively extended the patent, it declined Bolar’s invitation to create a “new

public.”).
325
Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 572 F. Supp. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev’d, 733
F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
326
Id. at 258.
327
The New York court distinguished the California ruling, because IRC had reaped
commercial value over a two-year period. Id. at 257.
328
Id.
329
Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 534–35. See ANDA/Patent Restoration Proposal
Has Reached First Legislative Form: Discussion Draft Distributed in DC on April 5, After
Two Months in the Mil, PINK SHEET, Apr. 9, 1984 (referring to the draft as “the product of two
months of work by Waxman’s Health Subcmte. staff”).
330
Bolar, 733 F.2d at 858.
331
Id. at 863.
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exception” for “FDA-required testing.”332
With this ruling, Waxman’s language, which included an experimental
use exception for a patent owner’s competitors, reversed settled law. The
patent bar became “increasingly distressed” about this exception.333
Legislative staff made only modest changes before releasing a second
discussion draft, however, and left the exception in place.334 The hostility of
the drafts to drug patents prompted agrochemical companies to seek
severance from the pending bill, but the drug patent owners did not have this
option.335 The primary negotiator for PMA, representing the innovators,
later commented that he had “no leverage” after loss of the House vote, and
that “negotiating” with Representative Waxman was “one of the worst
experiences” of his career.336 Further discussions did not materially improve
prospects for drug patent owners.
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Representative Waxman introduced
the revised language on June 12 and 21, respectively, presenting it as a fait
accompli.337 The one-paragraph provision for generic applications had
evolved into nearly thirty pages governing the content of, and procedures
for, submission and review of abbreviated applications, as well as a complex
scheme for premarket resolution of patent disputes between drug patent
owners and generic applicants.338 An abbreviated application would cite the
innovator’s application and, rather than containing its own safety and
effectiveness data, rely on the data the innovator had submitted.339 For a new
chemical entity approved between January 1982 and enactment, however,
these data could not be used—the FDA could not approve an ANDA—until
ten years had passed.340 No other timing restrictions applied; the data in other
innovator applications—whether approved before 1982 or after enactment—
could be used immediately. The bill also reversed the Federal Circuit ruling,
permitting a patent owner’s competitors to manufacture and test infringing
332

Id. at 863–64.
Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 540.
334
Id. at 538.
335
See H.R. 5529, 98th Cong. (introduced April 26, 1984) (proposing patent term
restoration for animal drugs and biologics, pesticides, and chemicals regulated under TSCA).
336
Email from Peter Hutt to Erika Lietzan (Aug. 21, 2017) (on file with author);
Representative Henry Waxman, Author of the Hatch-Waxman Act, CLAUSE 8 30:11–30:45
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.clause8.tv/ (“They did not have leverage after that loss and when
I was chairman of the subcommittee.”).
337
S. 2748, 98th Cong. (1984); H.R. 3605, 98th Cong. (1984) [hereafter JUNE
LANGUAGE]; see also PMA’s Engman and GPIA’s Haddad Will Explain Patent
Restoration/ANDA Compromise at Rep. Kastenmeier’s Hearing June 6; PMA Endorses Bill,
PINK SHEET (June 4, 1984), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS006685.
338
JUNE LANGUAGE, supra note 337.
339
Id. at proposed 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
340
Id. at proposed 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(D).
333
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products during the patent term.341
The patent restoration provisions differed in four respects from
proposals of the past. Every difference shortened the time that PTO would
restore.
First, PTO would restore only half the clinical testing period (after
patent issuance).342 The Kastenmeier bill had applied a fifty percent
recovery rule to clinical trials continuing more than ten years after the patent
application. The average patentee would thus receive his lost time back and
could enjoy the nominal seventeen-year term. Under the Waxman bill, in
contrast, no drug inventor could ever receive all of his lost patent life back.
Fifty percent of the patent term during testing was permanently forfeited.
Second, PTO would restore no more than five years, no matter how long
testing and FDA review took.343 The notion of a cap was not new, but prior
bills had restored every day of lost life and applied a cap based on average
clinical experience, ensuring that the average firm would enjoy the nominal
seventeen-year term. The generic drug bill applied the cap after the fifty
percent penalty, and the number was arbitrary.344 The cap had no function
other than to reduce the amount of patent life restored.
Third, total effective patent life would be limited to fourteen years.345
The bill imposed a number lower than the nominal patent term and the
effective patent life enjoyed by other inventors. No one pretended this was
anything but an effort to shorten the patent life of drugs.346 The head of the
generic trade association later commented that restoring even just seven
years of the lost patent term “would have destroyed the generic industry.”347
In other words, even after the bill gave generic companies the right to rely
on innovator testing data and the right to make and use patented drugs for
testing during the patent term, drug inventors would have to enjoy a shorter
patent term than other inventors for generic companies to have a viable
341

Id. at proposed 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
Id. at proposed 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(2).
343
Id. at proposed 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(4).
344
Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 191 (“numbers pulled out of the air”); Interview with
Bill Corr (Mar. 29, 2018) (characterizing the numbers as “just balancing”).
345
JUNE LANGUAGE, supra note 337, at proposed 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3).
346
There were precedents for the number, to be sure. Before 1861, the initial term of a
utility patent had been fourteen years. An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, § 1, 1
Stat. 109, 110 (Apr. 10, 1790). Today design patents last fifteen years. 35 U.S.C. § 173. But
the legislative history does not suggest either precedent was considered. The Commissioner
of Patents later reported that the number was arbitrary. Mossinghoff, supra note 24, at 191.
An economist involved in the discussions reports “folklore” that Haddad “at hearings put up
a poster showing that many leading products had a life of 14 years before being largely
supplanted by brand competition and that was the basis” for the 14-year limit. Email from
Henry Grabowski to Erika Lietzan (Aug. 25, 2017) (on file with author).
347
Shuler, supra note 194, at 27.
342
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business model. Finally, the bill limited the patents that could be restored,
generally disallowing extension of a patent if the compound had been
claimed in an earlier issued patent.348 This reflected the generic industry’s
complaints about drug patenting practices, but it would not survive the
summer.
With the national conventions and upcoming presidential election
preoccupying policymakers and compressing the legislative schedule,
Senator Hatch informed the innovative trade association that the generic
drug provisions would be enacted with or without their support.349 PMA’s
board of directors voted, narrowly and over vigorous objection, to endorse
the legislation.350
The House Energy and Commerce Committee reported the language
the day it was introduced, after a hearing that “lasted barely thirty
minutes.”351 Representative Bliley complained, calling it “distressing and
regrettable that this Committee has reported a complex, lengthy, and highly
significant piece of legislation without holding hearings in either the Health
Subcommittee or in the full Committee and after what can only be described
as a pro forma markup.”352 Six days later, on June 27, a subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee held a hearing at which the Patent Office
objected to the provision disallowing restoration of later-issued patents and
to the experimental use exception.353 Although the two industry trade
associations endorsed the legislation, a substantial group of innovators—the
ten largest members of PMA—dissented on the same grounds and also
objected to use of their testing data.354 These objections were bolstered by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, released the same
week, which confirmed that the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment
348

JUNE LANGUAGE, supra note 337, at proposed 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4).
Engelberg, supra note 20, at 396.
350
See PMA’s Engman and GPIA’s Haddad Will Explain Patent Restoration/ANDA
Compromise at Rep. Kastenmeier’s Hearing June 6; PMA Endorses Bill, PINK SHEET (June
4, 1984), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS006685 (reporting a May 31 vote
within PMA of 22 to 12 in favor of the Waxman legislation).
351
See Senate Labor & Human Resources Cmte. Hearing on Patent Restoration/ANDA
Bill Set for June 28; Waxman Proposal Clears House Commerce Cmte. June 12, PINK SHEET,
June 18, 1984 (“Waxman asked ‘unanimous consent’ that the compromise amendment be
considered as read, and then plunged into an explanation of the legislation before Luken could
make a point of order assertion. Dingell then ruled that Luken had not made his point of order
in a timely manner, and then cmte. quickly proceeded to the vote. Only Rep. Bliley (R-Va.)
voted no.”).
352
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt.1, at 76 (1984) (minority views of Mr. Bliley); see also id. at
76 (“We do this institution a disservice by hastily reporting on the very day of introduction, a
complex bill outside the expertise of the Committee after a ‘markup’ that lasted barely thirty
minutes.”).
353
Innovation and Patent Law Reform, supra note 201, at 385–404.
354
Id. at 423–513.
349
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protects some testing data submitted to federal regulators.355 The Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources held a brief hearing on June 28,
with a few of the same witnesses.356 Supporters of the legislation, including
the generic trade association, emphasized that the compromise was
“delicate” and should not be dismantled.357
Few changes were made in the summer. Arguments that the legislation
reflected a delicate “balance” held sway, given the time pressures.358 In July,
for instance, the House Judiciary subcommittee rejected—on party lines—
the Patent Office’s proposal to replace the later-issued patents restriction
with an outer limit of expiry twenty-five years after the first patent
application.359 The subcommittee also rejected a proposal that retroactive
application of the experimental use exception be a condition of patent term
restoration.360 All proposed amendments failed, except a proposal to delete
animal drugs from the bill—these patent owners now had more favorable
treatment in a freestanding bill.361 The full House Judiciary Committee
reported the bill on July 31, with one minor amendment.362 A vote in the
House was scheduled for the week of August 6.363
The Senate Judiciary Committee had not yet marked up the Senate
version of the bill. In this first week of August, with adjournment for the
Republican Convention looming, Representative Waxman and Senator
Hatch brokered a handful of additional and more significant changes.364 The
ten dissenting drug companies had argued, with academic support, that the
experimental use provision would be an uncompensated taking of private
property.365 To ensure their support of this potentially unconstitutional
355

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991–93, 1012–13 (1984).
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on S.2748
Before the Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 18 (1984). The FDA testified at this
hearing.
357
Innovation and Patent Law Reform, supra note 201, at 422 (Rep. Sawyer: “I was just
going to say, in the 8 years that I have been here, I have never seen a compromise that wasn’t
a delicately balanced compromise, which is code for ‘Keep your damn hands off it.’” Mr.
Haddad: “Well put. Well put.”).
358
Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 546.
359
Id. at 545–46 (all Democrats opposed).
360
Id. at 545.
361
Id. at 546.
362
Id.
363
Id.
364
See Engelberg, supra note 20, at 405; Shuler, supra note 194, at 29–30; Alan D.
Lourie, A Political History of Patent Term Restoration Part II, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE,
Feb. 1985, at 52.
365
Innovation and Patent Law Reform, supra note 201, at 437–43; see id. at 513–22
(testimony and written statement of Professor Dorsen); id. at 721–38 (analysis of Professor
Monaghan); see also Engelberg, supra note 20, at 405 (noting that Professor Tribe concluded
the provision was unconstitutional).
356
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provision, the drafters eliminated the patent term restoration limitation to
first-issued patents.366 Although it would never be possible to achieve a
seventeen-year patent term, it might now be possible to reach fourteen years
with a continuation patent.367 Responding, in part, to arguments about the
constitutionality of using innovator data grounded in the Monsanto ruling,
the drafters also delayed generic applicant reliance on these data for five
years after FDA approval of a new chemical entity.368 They also added a
separability provision.369
The patent litigation provisions were similarly the subject of intense
negotiation until the very end.370 The legislation created an artificial act of
infringement, giving the companies an opportunity to obtain certainty about
infringement (and any defense of invalidity) before generic market launch.371
It also provided incentives for generic companies to engage in this premarket
litigation. The first generic company to challenge an innovator’s patent (by
arguing that its product did not infringe or that the patent was invalid) was
eligible for 180 days of exclusivity in the marketplace.372 If the innovator’s
drug was a new chemical entity, any generic company that challenged the
patent could file four years—rather than five years—after NDA approval.373
The legislation also encouraged the innovator—if the innovator converted
this challenge promptly into litigation, FDA approval of the generic drug
would be stayed for a fixed period of time (or until a court decision, if the
decision came first).374 In the final negotiations of August 1984, this
automatic stay was lengthened from eighteen months to thirty months, which
counsel for Public Citizen viewed as a “major give” to the patent owners.375

366

See Engelberg, supra note 20, at 404–05.
As explained, a continuation patent could issue later — perhaps within a few years of
FDA approval. Because the patent term was seventeen years from patent issuance, this patent
would also expire later. As noted, this language imposed a fourteen-year limit on effective
patent life. Thus the patent owner could use restoration to extend the patent until fourteen
years after FDA approval.
368
S. 2926, 98th Cong. (introduced Aug. 9, 1984) (proposed 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(4)(D)((ii)); 130 CONG. REC. 23,769 (Aug. 10, 1984); Lourie, supra note 364, at 54.
369
Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 547; Engelberg, supra note 20, at 406.
370
Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 547.
371
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (1984).
372
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1984).
373
§ 355(j)(4)(D)(ii).
374
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
375
Email from William B. Schultz (May 12, 2018). Rep. Waxman characterized this
change as pivotal. 130 CONG. REC. 24,410, 24,430 (1984) (“The change from 18 to 30 months
was a change that brought on the dissident groups within the PMA and has brought us to a
package now that we can say with confidence is opposed by no one and backed by all of the
groups concerned . . . .”).
367
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The parties reached agreement in the final hour before the language had
to be introduced.376 Senator Hatch introduced the new language on August
9, and the Senate passed the bill on August 10.377 The House made several
changes, including removal of the separability provision, passing the bill by
a vote of 362 to 0 on September 6.378 The Senate approved the House
language by voice vote on September 12.379 President Reagan signed on
September 24.380
D. Splinter Legislation
Curiously, during this same time period Congress enacted four
additional laws restoring specific patents for companies regulated by the
FDA and USDA. The failed Kastenmeier bill had covered one of these
situations. The Hatch-Waxman bill covered a third until the House made its
final set of changes.
In January 1983, Congress restored nearly six years to the patent
covering the food additive aspartame.381 Had it passed, the Kastenmeier bill
would have provided the company relief.382 Approval of the patent owner’s
petition had been delayed while the FDA considered data integrity issues
raised by a third party.383 A review of the facts gives off a slight whiff of
376

See Shuler, supra note 194, at 29–30 (“Finally there were 20 minutes left to introduce
the bill into the Senate before the end of that session. ‘Hatch made his point of view very
clear . . . . Then he left the room.’ . . . Kennedy and Hatch literally ran the bill to the Senate
floor at about 2 a.m.”). Rep. Kastenmeier later derided the final language from the Senate as
a “backroom deal in the Senate involving the chief executive officer of one of the dissenting
drug companies and a lobbyist of one of the generic groups.” 130 CONG. REC. 24,428 (1984).
377
S. 2926, 98th Cong. (1984); 130 CONG. REC. 23,764–23,774 (1984).
378
Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 549; 130 CONG. REC. 24,416–24,458 (1984).
379
Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 548–49.
380
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
381
Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 11, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 155 (2011)).
382
S. 255, 97th Cong. (1981) (proposed § 155(c)(4)) (“[F]or products approved and for
which a stay of regulation granting approval pursuant to section 409 of the [FDCA] was in
effect as of January 1, 1981, the period of such patent extension shall be measured from the
date such stay was imposed until such proceedings are finally resolved and commercial
marketing permitted”).
383
Searle submitted its food additive petition in February 1973, and the FDA published a
regulation approving the first uses of this ingredient in July 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 27,317 (July
26, 1974). After objections to the approval, Searle voluntarily withheld the product from the
market while the FDA conducted a hearing before its new Public Board of Inquiry. Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 424–25 (July 22,
September 30, October 1, 7, November 5, 12, and 18, 1981) (statement of John E. Robson,
Executive Vice President, G.D. Searle 7 Co.) [hereafter ROBSON STATEMENT]. Meanwhile,
concerns arose about the integrity of data generated for Searle by a contract laboratory, so the
FDA stayed the effective date of the regulation. 40 Fed. Reg. 56,907 (Dec. 5, 1975). An
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mishandling by the FDA, at least during the final three years of delay.384
“Delays of this type,” the company argued, “especially when a perishable
commodity like patent life is in the balance . . . go beyond the bounds of
reason or excuse.”385 Section 155 of the Patent Act described the situation
in general terms, and required that any patent encompassing the composition
of matter or process of using the composition in such a situation be extended
by the amount of time from the stay of the food additive regulation
(authorizing market entry) until the FDA finally permitted commercial
marketing.386
In addition, in 1983, Congress restored five years and three months to
two patents covering Forane (isoflurane), a halogenated inhalation anesthetic
used for surgery.387 The drug was ready for approval in 1976, but the FDA
issued a non-approvable letter after a study in mice performed by a
researcher at the Veterans Administration suggested the drug might be
carcinogenic and teratogenic.388 Further investigation revealed that the mice
had been contaminated with polybrominated biphenyls,389 and the FDA
approved the application in December 1979.390 It cleared the manufacturing
facility for operation in May 1981.391 The patent had issued in 1970,
however, and the Senate sponsors explained that “because of an egregiously
long approval process demanded by the Food and Drug Administration, only
a small part of the seventeen-year patent term to which the company was
entitled was effectively available to them.”392 The “hardship” had been

independent organization of academic scientists confirmed the authenticity of the data in late
1978. ROBSON STATEMENT, supra, at 427. Because the stay had been based on data integrity
concerns, this should have ended the matter. The FDA still declined to lift the stay for three
more years, however, insisting on the hearing. See 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285 (July 24, 1981).
384
See generally supra note 383.
385
ROBSON STATEMENT, supra note 383, at 427.
386
Searle held one patent on the use of aspartame as a sweetener (U.S. Patent No.
3,492,131) and assured Congress that it was not aware of other patents captured by the
language. ROBSON STATEMENT, supra note 383, at 424, 433. In the end, however, PTO
extended 32 patents. See PTO, Patent Terms Extended Under 35 U.S.C. § 155. Rich Cooper,
who had been chief counsel at the FDA during this process, commented later that this resulted
from “poor draftsmanship.” Rich Cooper, Legislative Patent Extensions, 48 FOOD & DRUG
L. J. 59, 65 n.32 (1993).
387
Pub. L. 98-127, 97 Stat. 831 (1983).
388
Thomas H. Corbett, Cancer and Congenital Anomalies Associated with Anesthetics,
271 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 58, 58 (1976); see also 129 CONG. REC. 11,509 (1983) (remarks of
Senator East).
389
Bijan K. Basak, Isoflurane as a General Anesthetic: Will it Displace All Other Volatile
Anesthetics, 21 ANESTHESIOLOGY 614 (1984); 129 CONG. REC. at 11,509 (Senator East); 35
U.S.C. § 155A (1983).
390
Approval Letter (NDA 17-624) (Dec. 18, 1979).
391
129 CONG. REC. at 11509 (Senator East).
392
Id. (remarks of Senator Thurmond).
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“unfair.”393 Section 155A of the Patent Act restored the time from the initial
non-approvable letter in 1976 to removal of the final regulatory impediment
in 1981.394 The proposal was uncontroversial and enjoyed bipartisan
support.395
On the day that President Reagan signed the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments, Congress passed a private bill restoring patents that protected
Micronase (glyburide), Diabeta (glyburide), and Glucotrol (glipizide), which
were all second generation sulfonylurea drugs intended for management of
diabetes.396 The FDA had found the drugs safe and effective in 1974, which
should have resulted in approval. The agency delayed final approval letters,
however, while it considered whether to require new safety language in the
labeling of all oral hypoglycemic drugs.397 The agency finally settled on
class labeling for sulfonylurea drugs in April 1984, and approved the second
generation drugs in May 1984.398 During these ten years, however, the first
generation sulfonylurea drugs had remained on the market with the previous
labeling in place.399 The final Hatch-Waxman legislation passed by the
Senate on August 10 included separate language restoring these patents,400
but the House removed it after the August recess when it removed the
separability provision.401 Congress passed a private bill one month later,
extending five patents until April 21, 1992, which added about five years to
each and resulted in an effective patent life of roughly eight years.402
393

Id. (remarks of Senator East).
35 U.S.C. § 155A (1984).
395
129 CONG. REC. at 11,509 (Senator Thurmond).
396
Priv. L. No. 98-46, 98 Stat. 3434 (1984); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-1060 (1984) (text
of private bill), reprinted in PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 75.
397
The labeling issue stemmed from a controversial study assessing the effectiveness of
four other oral hypoglycemic drugs, which found an association between the drugs and
increased cardiovascular mortality. See Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410 (1st Cir. 1973).
Many diabetes specialists believed the study flawed, however, because of deficiencies in trial
design and statistical analysis, and the FDA struggled to interpret the findings. CURTIS
MEINERT, THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY GROUP DIABETES PROGRAM 91–
107 (2015) (describing the reaction in the media and scientific journals); Oral Hypoglycemic
Drugs ‘Reported’ Association with Cardiovascular Death Will Be Required in Labeling for
Class of Agents, FDA Final Rule States, PINK SHEET, Apr. 16, 1984 (summarizing the “14year debate over how the FDA should handle the UGDP findings”).
398
PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 8–9 (statement of Mark Rogart); see
also Labeling for Oral Hypoglycemic Drugs of the Sulfonylurea Class, 49 Fed. Reg. 14,303
(Apr. 11, 1984) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 310) (requiring cardiovascular warning
in labeling of oral hypoglycemic drugs because of the study).
399
PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 9.
400
See 130 CONG. REC. at 23,773 (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 155A).
401
Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 548–49. The House simply never considered this
Title. See 130 CONG. REC. at 24,416–24,458 (1984).
402
H.R. REP. NO. 98-1060 (1984) (text of private bill), reprinted in PRIVATE PATENT
LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 12, 75.
394
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Finally, in October 1984, Congress restored a patent claiming a sterile
solid whey blend used to increase milk production in cows.403 Impro
Products had submitted its application to the Veterinary Biologics Division
(VBD) of the Department of Agriculture in 1965, and VBD issued a special
two-year license allowing the company to conduct field tests in support of a
permanent license.404 A scientist in another agency persuaded VBD to delay
the permanent license for six months while he ran tests.405 What followed
was both irregular and improper. The scientist released his conclusion—that
the whey blend did not significantly improve milk production—before
finishing his tests.406 After the study results were rejected for publication,
the scientist overcame the rejection by hand-delivering a copy of the
manuscript to the President of the American Veterinary Medical
Association, whom he persuaded to insist on publication.407 VBD refused to
share his data, even when pressed by a member of Congress.408 When Impro
finally secured the raw data, it became clear that the scientist’s team had not
followed its own written protocols.409 By the time Impro came to Congress
seeking relief, a district court had found that the study report contained false
and misleading statements.410 Still, the company did not have approval.411
The USDA and the Department of Justice opposed relief for this reason; the
product had not yet been found effective.412 The Commissioner of Patents,
in contrast, supported relief.413 The Senate Judiciary Committee, which
assumed the product would not receive approval before patent expiry in
April 1985, concluded that a new seventeen-year patent term was
appropriate, “based on the fact that due to unjustified government
403
Priv. L. No. 98-34, 98 Stat. 3430 (1984). Secondary accounts sometimes identify the
product as “Impro,” but Impro was the manufacturer. The product was known as Whey Blend.
404
H.R. REP. NO. 98-1061 (1984), reprinted in PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note
120, at 83.
405
Id.
406
PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 83; see J.W. Smith et al., Whey
Antibody Preparation: Effects of Prepartum Injection on Milk Production in Dairy Cows, 31
AM. J. VETERINARY RES. 1485 (1970).
407
Id.
408
Id.
409
Id.
410
Impro Prods., Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing Impro
Products, Inc. v. Block, No. 81-1284 (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 1982) (Memorandum and Order)).
411
PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 80. The company had been able to
market within its home state of Iowa; this did not involve interstate commerce, which deprived
the USDA of jurisdiction. See id. at 30.
412
Id. at 62 (memorandum from the Department of Agriculture explaining that Impro had
neither submitted data to contradict the report’s basic conclusion nor submitted its own
efficacy data to justify a permanent approval).
413
Id.
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involvement, Impro ha[d] never been allowed an opportunity to exploit its
patent.”414 The House settled on fifteen years, reasoning that the company
had enjoyed two years of field testing under the special license.415
IV. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN
AMENDMENTS
The high water mark for patent term restoration legislation lasted from
July 1981 (passage of the Kastenmeier bill by the Senate) until September
1982 (rejection of the bill by the House, despite majority support). Drug
patent owners supported patent term restoration because it would lengthen
their effective patent life and increase their revenues. Rather than simply
arguing that restoration was in their economic interests, however, they
grounded the justification in concerns about incentives to innovate. In other
words, they invoked the public’s interest in a continuing supply of new
treatments. Academic economists bolstered these utilitarian arguments. By
and large, patent owners eschewed arguments about compensation for
sacrificed patent time and about ensuring equal treatment (outcomes) for all
types of patent owners, leaving others (such as the PTO) to make these
arguments.
Patent owners in other regulated industries supported patent term
restoration for the same reason—it would lengthen their effective patent
life—and made the same arguments—mainly utilitarian. These other patent
owners were fairly engaged in the legislative push through the late 1970s
into the early 1980s.416 When the generic industry engaged fully and the
policy debate turned to drug patents and drug prices, these patent owners
engaged less and often engaged separately. When Waxman released the
generic drug bill in April 1984, many patent owners broke off, realizing that
the prospects for patent term restoration had diminished considerably
because of joinder with drug pricing issues.
By the late 1970s, the FDA had fully joined the innovating companies
in supporting patent term restoration, citing the length of premarket
programs, shortened effective patent life, and concerns about incentives to
innovate. As late as spring 1982, the agency held the view that innovators
should have seventeen years of effective exclusivity. The agency
experienced several rapid changes in leadership during this period: two
Democrat-appointed Commissioners between introduction of the first patent
term restoration bill in April 1979 and January 1981, and two Republican414

Id. at 80.
Id. at 81.
416
E.g., The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 59 (1981) (testimony of various individuals from the pesticide
industry).
415
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appointed Commissioners between January 1981 and enactment of the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments in fall 1984.417 Still, the FDA remained fairly
consistent in its views. The agency was well aware that its statute, programs,
and policies were seen as responsible for the shortened effective patent life.
It may have viewed patent term restoration as a way to protect its new and
increasingly robust premarket research and development paradigm. This, in
turn, might reflect a technocratic commitment to the premarket model that
the agency helped to develop, or an effort to protect the agency’s reputation
and role in the economy.
PTO’s support for patent term restoration was mostly unqualified, even
during the Carter years, and its continuously strong support after Reagan
took office probably reflected the new Administration’s policy objectives.
Beginning in 1982, the Commissioner of Patents was also an UnderSecretary of Commerce, and was thus closely connected to both the White
House and the Reagan Administration’s policy initiatives to foster
innovation in industry. The PTO tended to argue from the economic theory
of the patent and the role of patents in stimulating innovative behavior. The
Office also focused on equal treatment of patent owners. For instance, the
Commissioner of Patents commented repeatedly that it would be “unfair” to
establish a different patent term for a highly profitable industry. 418 The
Office also tended to focus broadly on all patents shortened by premarket
regulatory requirements, rather than specifically on drug patents. Indeed,
despite supporting an outer limit on the effective life of restored continuation
patents, PTO was firmly committed to restoration of every affected patent
covering a regulated product.
Despite PTO’s emphasis on ensuring all patentees enjoyed equal patent
rights and on compensating for sacrificed time, the innovative industry’s
arguments about ensuring adequate incentives for innovation had more
traction in Congress. This may explain why the petroleum industry was
rebuffed. Although the bills proposing patent term restoration between 1979
and 1984 varied in their approach, they generally included the full range of
products subject to premarket review: medical devices, animal drugs, food

417
These were Donald Kennedy (April 1979 to June 1979), Jere Goyan (October 1979 to
January 1981), Arthur Hayes (April 1981 to September 1983), and Frank Young (July 1984
to December 1989). See FDA, Commissioners, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/History/
FOrgsHistory/Leaders/ucm2006081.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).
418
E.g., PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION, supra note 120, at 17; Innovation and Patent Law
Reform, supra note 201, at 46 (“They have pointed to high profit margins of industries which
would benefit from this type of legislation and have concluded that, as a consequence, there
is no problem. I would suggest that it would be clearly unfair to establish different effective
patent terms depending on the potential economic success of a particular sector of
technology.”).

LIETZAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

11/28/2018 1:51 PM

HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS

113

and color additives, pesticides, and new chemicals.419 In contrast, there was
never any possibility that the legislation would include the petroleum
industry.420 These companies had argued that environmental regulations
delay the opening of refineries, precluding enjoyment of patents claiming
catalysts used in the refining process.421 Judge Lourie explained in 1984 why
legislators declined their request for restoration.422 The companies were not
marketing a patented product subject to premarket review, and the key
business decision—whether to build a refinery—would not be influenced by
the length of patent protection for the catalyst.423 The patent term legislation
was grounded in testimony and empirical evidence that patent term distortion
affected commercialization decisions. The legislation was intended to
restore the commercialization incentive by repairing the distortion, but if the
connection between effective patent life and the desired business decision
was lacking, there was no basis for restoration.
Patent owners, joined by the PTO, the FDA, and academic economists,
argued that the public would benefit from the Kastenmeier legislation
through an increase in innovation. Others, however, argued that the public
would bear the costs of the legislation—at least with respect to drug
patents—because a delay in generic drug entry meant consumers would pay
more for a medicine for a longer period of time. Public Citizen made this
argument for the public, leading to a clash in arguments about where the
public’s interest lay. PTO took the opposite view: increased prices would be
offset by the development of new products.424 The generic drug companies
made a variety of arguments, such as questioning the need for restoration,
but they too were focused on the harm to the public. These companies were
acting out of self-interest as much as the patent owners were, as patent term
restoration would delay their market entry, but they invoked social welfare
arguments and thus aligned their advocacy with that of Public Citizen.
A variety of explanations have been offered for the failure of the bill in
September 1982. The bill would have passed, had it not been placed on the
suspension calendar.425 Supporters may have been overconfident. In
419

For instance, as previously discussed, the Kastenmeier proposals applied to any
product subject to federal premarket regulatory review. See generally Section III.A.1.
420
Lourie, Account, supra note 24, at 529.
421
Id.
422
Id.
423
Id.
424
The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981—S. 255: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 40 (1981) (testimony of Rene D. Tegtmeyer) (“Whatever effects it
might have, in terms of increasing drug prices, if that does occur to any extent, I think would
be more than offset by a return in the form of making available to the public many new drugs
or pharmaceuticals, many new pesticides, and other new products.”).
425
As previously noted, a majority of the House voted for passage. See supra Section
III.A.4.
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addition, several members of the House who likely would have supported
the bill were not present to vote, and at least one account suggests their
flights were delayed by airport fog.426 There is, however, a deeper
explanation for its failure. The generic companies had coalesced as a group
around the issue of patent term restoration, forming a new trade association
under a leader who had an influential voice in Washington policymaking
circles. During the winter of 1981 to 1982, the generic industry’s voice grew
stronger, and it continued to focus policymakers on the pricing impact of
patent term restoration. Pricing arguments may have been particularly
compelling to members concerned about reelection, because prescription
drugs were generally not covered by public or private health insurance.427
The tide turned when the generic companies shifted to seeking
affirmative changes in the law, rather than merely opposing patent term
restoration. The key to understanding the final legislation is understanding
that the generic companies did not simply seek policies that would have to
be married with, or reconciled with, policies sought by patent owners.
Instead, they sought precisely the opposite policy outcome. Drug patent
owners wanted longer exclusivity in the market through longer effective
patent life. The generic companies wanted drug patent owners to have
shorter exclusivity in the market.
The tide turned in 1982 and 1983, in particular, because the generic
industry suffered a series of policymaking defeats in those years that
prevented them from achieving this policy outcome through other means.
An administrative proposal to permit these companies to file ANDAs
withered on the vine in March 1982, and the Supreme Court decided the
same month it would consider whether they could bring generic drugs to
market without testing and without submitting applications.428 A federal
court ruled in July 1982 that they could not test their generic products during
the patent term.429 The fact that they pressed hard in August and September
1982 to oppose the Kastenmeier patent term restoration bill now makes
sense. In March 1983, the possibility of bringing generic drugs to market as
old drugs without marketing applications evaporated with the Supreme

426

Lourie, History, Summary, and Appraisal, supra note 24, at 354.
See Thomas Oliver et al., A Political History of Medicare and Prescription Drug
Coverage, 82 MILBANK Q. 283, 293 (2004) (noting that prescription drug coverage was
limited both for Medicare beneficiaries and for patients insured through private insurance
companies). Congress did not add an outpatient prescription drug benefit for Medicare
beneficiaries until 2003. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
428
United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
429
Pfizer, Inc. v. Int’l Rectifier Corp., No. 73-58, 1982 WL 51039 (C.D. Cal. July 20,
1982).
427
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Court’s Generix ruling.430
With these policymaking defeats, the generic drug companies now
sought a policy outcome that was exactly the opposite of the outcome sought
by the innovators. They wanted an exception to infringement so they could
develop and test their copies during the patent term, and they wanted to rely
on the safety and effectiveness data generated by patent owners. These
policy changes would shorten the effective exclusivity of innovative drugs
in the market. The generic drug companies turned to Waxman for support,
and he introduced generic drug legislation shortly after.
Because the two sides sought directly conflicting policy outcomes, it is
a bit odd to speak of a compromise in which each side benefitted. Unless
the law was a wash, the possible outcomes were binary. Either the patent
owners would on the whole have more time before generic competition, or
they would have less.
With this in mind, the final legislation can be examined—considering
each industry before and after enactment. The discussion that follows is not
meant to be normative, nor does it make claims about the relative allocation
of benefits and costs under the scheme as it stands today (as amended by
Congress and as interpreted by the FDA and the courts). Rather, it is a
historically contextualized assessment of the benefits and costs in September
1984, considering the state of the law as it stood the day before and the day
after enactment.
Patent owners came to the table with a problem—a loss of effective
patent life because of federal regulatory requirements. They emerged with
some of this loss mitigated, and in this respect they benefited from the
legislation. In the process, however, they lost the right to enforce their
patents while competitors manufactured and tested infringing products. The
lead negotiator for the generic industry association explains that patent term
restoration and the experimental use provision were “self-canceling” and
“taken together, have no net effect on the length of the exclusive marketing
period of most new drugs.”431 In addition, patent owners lost exclusivity in
their testing data five years after approval.432 Many refer to the five-year
period as a benefit the innovative companies received in the legislation, but
this is incorrect as a historical matter.433 There was no pathway for approval
of applications relying on innovator data before Reagan signed the statute on
September 24. The legislation removed all but five years of the data

430
431
432
433

(2016).

United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453 (1983).
Engelberg, supra note 20, at 392.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(D)((ii) (1984).
See Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 103–10
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exclusivity the patent owners had enjoyed before.434
The generic drug companies came to the table with a different problem:
they were subject to the same regulatory requirements as everyone else,
meaning they were required to conduct clinical trials and file full
applications. In addition, they were subject to the intellectual property rights
of others—patent rights and the FDA’s treatment of testing data as trade
secrets. They emerged still subject to the patent and, indeed, the patent
would be a few years—but never more than five years—longer. They could,
however, develop and test their products during the patent term, saving them
three to five years.435 As the lead lawyer for the generic companies
explained, these provisions cancelled each other out.436 Now, however, they
could also rely on the patent owner’s testing data in their marketing
applications, saving them several years and the expensive of clinical testing.
This leaves the patent litigation provisions.
Although some
characterize these provisions as benefiting the patent owners, a historically
contextualized reading suggests they were at most a wash and may have
benefitted the generic industry. The key is that they cannot be considered in
the abstract; they must be read with the remaining patent provisions of the
statute—the experimental use exception, the artificial act of infringement,
and patent term restoration. The impact can be illustrated best with
hypotheticals.
Assume the administrative burdens are comparable. The patent owner
must list its patents in its application, and the generic applicant must address
those patents in its own application and send a letter to the innovator.
Assume these are a wash. To simplify the analysis, also assume there is only
one patent, and assume the innovative product is a new chemical entity. In
order to draw a comparison, assume further that (1) the effective patent life,
without restoration, is nine years; (2) the generic company needed six years
to prepare an application before enactment and would need four years to
prepare an application after enactment; (3) the innovator enjoys the
maximum five years of patent term restoration; and (4) the FDA takes two
years to review and approve a generic application both before and after
enactment. In other words, assume a small benefit from the law for the
generic company (no more than two years shaven off the application process)
434

The myth that innovators received five years in this legislation may stem from the fact
that the June draft permitted copies immediately after NDA approval. The five-year provision
was added in August. But when one compares the final enacted law with the state of the law
before enactment, there can be no dispute that NDA holders lost all but five years of
exclusivity.
435
As explained in Section III.C., supra, previously generic companies seeking to market
copies of post-1962 innovative products were required to perform clinical trials and to submit
full new drug applications.
436
Engelberg, supra note 20, at 392.
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and the maximum benefit from the law for the innovator (maximum patent
term restoration).
Consider first a scenario in which the generic company chooses not to
challenge the patent. Under the law of September 23, before enactment, this
company waited for the patent to expire (nine years), developed and studied
its drug (six years), and waited for approval (two years). The generic
company would reach the market seventeen years after the innovator. After
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, this company could develop
and study its drug (for four years) and wait for FDA approval (for two years)
during the patent term. It could submit its ANDA five years after the
innovative drug approval, and the FDA would approve the ANDA when the
patent expired—at nine years plus five years patent term restoration. The
generic company would reach the market fourteen years after the innovator.
The generic company’s position improved with the enactment of the HatchWaxman Amendments. If the patent owner did not receive the full five years
of patent term restoration, of course, the generic company’s position after
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments would be even more favorable.
Consider second a scenario in which the generic company chooses to
challenge the validity of the patent. Assume also that it decides to start
developing its copy immediately after FDA approval of the innovative
product. Under the law of September 23, this company—believing the
patent invalid—did not wait for the patent to expire. Immediately after FDA
approval of the innovative product, it developed and studied its copy (six
years) and waited for FDA approval (two years). But it took these steps at
risk, because there was no experimental use exception. It would reach the
market eight years after the innovator and would then face immediate patent
infringement litigation and possible damages for infringement. After
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, this company would still
begin work immediately. It would develop and study its drug (four years)
and file the ANDA immediately. The statute permits a generic company to
file an application with a patent challenge four years after FDA approval of
the innovator’s drug.437 The FDA can take two years or more to review the
generic application,438 but this is mostly beside the point because, if the
437

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2018).
The FDA’s current goal is to review and act on 90 percent of standard original ANDAs
within 10 months of their submission date. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GDUFA
REAUTHORIZATON PERFORMANCE GOALS AND PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS FISCAL YEARS
2018–2022, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/
GenericDrugUserFees/UCM525234.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). In the first three quarters
of 2018 the average time to a tentative approval was 33 months, 21 months, and 31 months.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ACTIVITIES REPORT OF THE GENERIC DRUGS PROGRAM (FY
2018)–GDUFA II QUARTERLY PERFORMANCE, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou
/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/GenericDrugs/ucm600678.htm (last visited Oct.
438
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innovator brings a timely suit, the statute precludes approval of the generic
drug until seven and a half years after the innovator’s drug.439 Thus, the
generic company would reach the market seven and a half years after the
innovator. In the meantime, it would have been litigating the patent case.
So it would reach the market sooner and have an opportunity to test its theory
of invalidity without risking infringement damages. The generic company’s
position improved with enactment of Hatch-Waxman.
Some characterize the thirty-month delay of approval in the event of
patent litigation as tantamount to a statutorily imposed preliminary
injunction.440 The patent owner, after all, benefits from an automatic stay of
approval, without having to make the showings needed for a preliminary
injunction.441 Perhaps the patent owner would not have won a preliminary
injunction if it had gone to court before the Hatch-Waxman Amendments,
though the courts were generous with preliminary injunctions.442 In such a
situation, one could say that the generic company is now (after enactment)
barred from the market for thirty months despite not infringing, though it
would not have been barred before the statute was passed. The generic drug
companies, however, told Representative Waxman that, as a practical matter,
they would generally wait for a court decision before launching a potentially
infringing product.443 Representative Waxman cited this fact in defense of
the thirty-month stay.444 Moreover, this characterization overlooks the rest
of the scheme. That is, if the statute had not passed, the generic company
would have filed a full new drug application, after performing its own
clinical trials. Thus, the entire timeline would have been shifted later, and
the generic company would have launched later.
A generic company challenging an innovator patent might not file its
ANDA at the four-year mark. The statute included the 180-day exclusivity
incentive for the first to challenge a patent, however, which would tend to
lead to submission at the four-year mark. In the interests of completeness,
24, 2018). The FDA issues “tentative approval” when an ANDA review of the application is
complete and the application satisfies the statutory approval standard, but the agency cannot
grant final approval (giving permission to market the drug) due to a patent or regulatory
exclusivity. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(dd)(AA).
439
§ 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
440
E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 58, at 358.
441
Id.
442
E.g., M.A. Cunningham, Preliminary Injunctive Relief in Patent Litigation, 35 IDEA:
J. L. & TECH. 213, 231 (1995) (finding that courts granted preliminary injunctions in 61
percent of patent cases between October 1, 1982, and December 31, 1993).
443
130 CONG. REC. 24,427 (1984) (remarks of Rep. Waxman) (“The facts of life are that
a generic drug manufacturer will await, as a practical matter, until the decision of a court on
a patent challenge before that manufacturer markets a generic drug. That is the information
they have given us as to their practice.”).
444
Id.
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assume that it instead chose to file at the seven-year mark. In this situation,
the numbers would change. If the innovator brought a timely suit, the statute
would preclude approval for thirty more months, until roughly nine and a
half years after the innovator. In this case, the generic drug company would
enter the market later than it would have entered the market (at the eightyear mark) before enactment, but this would happen only if the generic
company delayed submission several years—not if it filed at the earliest
possible opportunity, which presumably it would do, if it thought the patent
invalid and wanted 180-day exclusivity.
One reader of this paper in draft form commented that the benefit to the
patent owner from the patent provisions (and 30-month stay in particular) is
meaningful, unless one assumes that all patents are valid. The benefit
accrues to the patent owner, she remarked, whether or not the patent is valid,
and whether or not the patent is infringed. This is correct, as far as it goes,
but the question is not whether the patent provisions of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments contain isolated provisions benefitting the patent owner.
Undoubtedly they do. They also contain isolated provisions benefitting the
generic applicant, such as the experimental use exception and the prospect
of 180-day exclusivity. The question is whether drug patent owners (and
generic companies) were in a better or worse position after enactment than
before enactment. This question must be answered by looking at the scheme
as a whole.445
On the whole, the new law made generic companies better off, and it
made patent owners worse off.446 But the innovative industry’s trade
association testified in support of the Hatch-Waxman legislation in June
1984. One might ask why the association did so if the legislation would so
445

Professor Sachs contends that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments expanded patentee
rights. Sachs, supra note 20, at 396. In her view, the two industries would have little difficulty
“coming together to lobby for this statute,” given its concentrated benefits, and the “public
choice collective action problem”—in which the diffuse public would be unable to prevent
enactment—was “more exaggerated” than had been the case when Congress enacted the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 and the Bayh-Dole Act. Id. at 384. Consumer
groups might have opposed patent term extension, she writes, but would have been placated
by the generic drug pathway. Id. Public choice theory, she concludes, does not fully explain
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. Id. at 396. The broader legislative and regulatory climate
and Waxman’s legislative entrepreneurship must have contributed to the enactment. Id. at
386–89. Although I share her view of Waxman’s role, my review of the regulatory and
legislative history leads to a different conclusion—that the scheme did not expand patentee
rights, that the public had vicarious representation, and that the benefits were unilateral.
446
A discussion of the actual impact of the statute on the industries is beyond the scope
of this article, but it bears mentioning that both innovating and generic companies could have
benefitted significantly simply from the certainty that came with a final legislative resolution
of the issues. For one review of the empirical studies evaluating the impact of the statute on
innovator market exclusivity, see Aaron Kesselheim, An Empirical Review of Major
Legislation Affecting Drug Development: Past Experiences, Effects, and Unintended
Consequences, 89 MILBANK Q. 450, 477–81 (2011).
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clearly leave innovators in a worse position. The answer may simply be that,
particularly after Senator Hatch made it clear the legislation would be
enacted, acquiescing seemed safer than the alternative. Leadership of the
trade association may have concluded that this was the best outcome that the
industry could achieve. In addition, there always remained a risk that, if the
legislation were blocked, the FDA would resuscitate the proposed ANDA
regulation, perhaps with a very short exclusivity period under a Democratappointed Commissioner.
In truth, though, the innovators were bitterly divided about the
legislation. Just as the chemical industry patent owners broke away from the
Waxman bill, so too did the ten largest members of PMA—American Home
Products, Bristol-Myers, Carter-Wallace, Hoffman-La Roche, Johnson &
Johnson, Merck, Norwich Eaton (Procter & Gamble), Schering-Plough,
Squibb, and Stuart Pharmaceuticals (ICI Americas).447 These companies
stood to lose the most from the research use exemption, the half-hearted
restoration formula, and immediate use of their testing data upon NDA
approval. They testified and lobbied through the summer of 1984, focusing
on their objections. With Senator Hatch’s “with you or without you” threat,
they had little leverage, but several prominent legal scholars backed their
argument about the constitutionality of applying the new research use
exemption to already-issued patents.448 This, and the Monsanto decision—
which raised doubts about authorizing companies to rely on data submitted
to the FDA with an expectation of confidentiality—gave them a foothold to
secure last-minute changes.
If the dynamics were so disadvantageous as to result in legislation that
made patent owners worse off, one also has to wonder why the drafters made
any concessions at the eleventh hour. The last-minute concessions can be
explained as a response to genuine concerns about constitutionality. The
inclusion of (admittedly weakened) patent term restoration is harder to
explain, but it is surely relevant that the chief negotiator for the generic
companies viewed it as a “wash” with the experimental use exception.449 It
may also have been the price for Senator Hatch’s sponsorship of the
legislation, making it possible to characterize the scheme as a compromise
in which both sides received a little something.
Finally, the splinter legislation—individual patent term restoration bills
for three drugs, a food additive, and a veterinary biologic—may be part of
the story. The enactments make sense given the relative allocation of
benefits and costs and the distraction of the broader legislative debate. The
447
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on S.2748
Before the Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 113–15 (1984).
448
See supra note 365.
449
Engelberg, supra note 20, at 392.
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benefits of these bills were concentrated, and the companies who stood to
benefit were motivated to press for passage. In contrast, the costs of the bills
were dispersed; they would be borne by the general public through higher
prices during the patent terms, and the narrowness of the bills meant that the
impact on any one member of the public would be modest. As to each
product, would-be competitors would also bear the cost when their market
entry was delayed, but only companies planning to market those particular
products would have an incentive to engage in opposition to the bill. The
generic drug companies and Public Citizen may have chosen to focus instead
on battling the prospective and generally applicable patent term restoration
language, which would shape the competitive landscape for years to come.
There is, however, another angle to consider. Four of the companies
involved—Searle, Upjohn, Hoechst-Roussel, and Pfizer—were substantial
research-based pharmaceutical companies and members of PMA.450
Congress had resolved Searle’s situation in early 1983.451 The other three
companies were covered by separate language specific to their situation
included in the Hatch-Waxman legislation until the House vote in September
1984.452 Each also chose to support the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
through the summer of 1984.453 Handling their needs in stand-alone
language might have prevented them from joining the dissenters and, thus,
might have played a role in ensuring passage of the legislation.454
The fracturing of PMA had lasting consequences for the innovative
drug industry. By early 1985, the leadership that urged the companies to
accept the June deal had been replaced. Indeed, the Commissioner of
Patents, who had retired from his government position, assumed the

450
Time is Now for ANDA/Patent Restoration Bill, Sen. Hatch Tells PMA Firms Seeking
Changes: Second Look by Coalition Would be Welcome, He Adds, PINK SHEET, July 2, 1984
(listing 13 members of PMA that supported the legislation, including these three and Searle).
451
Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 11, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 155 (2011)).
452
130 CONG. REC. at 23,773 (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 155A); see also supra Section III.E.
453
Hoechst-Roussel, Upjohn & Pfizer Would Get Eight Year Patent Extensions for
Second Generation Oral Hypoglycemics Under Amendment Introduced by Thurmond, PINK
SHEET, July 9, 1984 (noting that Upjohn, Hoechst-Roussel, and Pfizer were “nominal
supporters” of the Hatch-Waxman bill).
454
That this might have been a deliberate strategy to split the innovators was suggested
to me by someone involved at the time, but two people in a position to confirm this as strategy
were unable to recall it. Nevertheless, twelve members of PMA opposed the legislation, and
if these four (who presumably supported the legislation, as they were listed as supporters in
June) had voted the other way, the vote would have been much closer—eighteen to sixteen,
rather than twenty-two to twelve. See PMA’s Engman and GPIA’s Haddad Will Explain
Patent Restoration/ANDA Compromise at Rep. Kastenmeier’s Hearing June 6; PMA
Endorses Bill, PINK SHEET (Jun. 4, 1984), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS00
6685/ (reporting a May 31 vote within PMA of 22 to 12 in favor of the Waxman legislation).
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presidency of PMA.455 That the generic trade association was not similarly
bitterly divided is telling.
This leaves the ultimate question: how did seven years of policy
discussions and full engagement by both affected industries result in
legislation that clearly benefitted one group rather than the other?
The legislative process turned out the way it did because the generic
companies benefitted from a classic “Baptists and bootleggers” alliance.
Professor Yandle first articulated the Baptists and bootleggers theory of
regulation in 1983.456 Both groups had vigorously supported Sunday Blue
Laws, which closed bars and liquor stores on Sundays in southern states.457
Baptists supported the blue laws on moral grounds, while bootleggers
supported them for economic reasons (they had exclusive sales on
Sundays).458 Yandle’s theory holds, in brief, that “durable social regulation
evolves when it is demanded by both of two distinctly different groups.”459
Baptists, he explained in 1999, “point to the moral high ground and give vital
and vocal endorsement of laudable public benefits promised by a desired
regulation.”460 Bootleggers, in contrast, “are simply in it for the money.”
They “grease the political machinery with some of their expected
proceeds.”461
The generic companies argued that their proposed policy changes
would increase and accelerate the supply of less expensive drugs. They
urged these policy changes because they would be selling the drugs in
question and would profit from the legislation’s passage. But, just as the
patent owners had done with respect to patent term restoration, they invoked
the public’s interest—here, in cheaper drugs. As a result, they received
strong support from the public sector, especially Public Citizen.462 The key
455

Mossinghoff Joins PMA Full-Time on Jan. 22: Stetler’s Continued Affiliation with
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By way of contrast, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—which today engages in
policymaking discussions, generally in support of measures to facilitate earlier generic drug
entry—did not play a meaningful role in the political process that led to enactment of the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments. It had been deeply involved in development of a model state
law to guide generic drug substitution, but it did not engage in the discussions relating to
patent term restoration or the generic drug bill. The FTC did not have the reputation and
influence then that it has today. After a series of hostile oversight hearings in 1979 and 1980
and unambiguous comments from members of Congress that it had “overstepped its bounds,”
the FTC cut back on consumer protection activities and became “relatively inactive” for most
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Public Citizen Litigation Group attorney involved in these negotiations,
William Schultz, would eventually become a prominent lawyer for generic
companies and, in this capacity, was deeply involved in the parallel policy
debate from 2003 to 2010 relating to copies of biological medicines.463
In the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, the generic
companies played the role of the bootleggers, and Public Citizen played the
role of the Baptists. This alliance was particularly effective because—
whether arguing against patent term restoration or for the generic drug
legislation (meaning the ANDA provision and the experimental use
exception)—the generic companies had one argument, which merged their
own economic interests (selling their wares) with the public’s interest (less
expensive alternatives to patented products, sooner). Representative Tom
Kindness (R-OH) even commented during the final debate before passage in
the House that he had “never known generic manufacturers to be clothed
quite so heavily in the cloak of consumerism and protection of senior
citizens” as had “been the case in the discussion” of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments.464
To be sure, the patent-owning companies had invoked the public’s
interest, as well, in favor of the robust patent term restoration of the
Kastenmeier bills, in which they had a financial interest. The interest in
question, however, was both distant in time and necessarily imprecise—a
greater likelihood of unspecified new treatments in the future. Also the PTO
would not play the role of the Baptist to the innovating industry’s bootlegger;
it generally leaned on the theory of the patent rather than extolling concrete
benefits that the public would receive. Thus, a Baptists-and-bootleggers
alliance could not bring the patent term restoration bills over the finish line.
Indeed, the innovative industry faced a basic problem that continues to
challenge scholars and policymakers; it could not prove the counterfactual.
There was no easy way to show that longer effective patent life would result
in more approved new drugs. Although some companies described research
programs forsaken,465 this testimony could be dismissed as self-serving. By
of the decade. Ross D. Petty, Reflections on My Experience with the Federal Trade
Commission Transition in the Early 1980s, 33 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 212 (2014).
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E.g., Ramsey Baghdadi, Flubbing the FOBs Opportunity: Follow-on Biologics
Winners and Losers, PINK SHEET (Oct. 1, 2007), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com
/PS080341/Flubbing-the-FOBs-Opportunity-Followon-Biologics-Winners—Losers. Later
he held significant positions in government, including as the General Counsel of Health and
Human Services under President Obama.
464
130 CONG. REC. 24,437 (1984) (“They are making money off of those people. Right?
They are making money off of those people just as surely as the innovators who invent
drugs.”).
465
E.g., Health and the Env’t Misc.—Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 340 (1981) (statement of
Dr. Lewis H. Sarett) (noting that Merck had abandoned development of treatments for cystic
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way of contrast, the short-term benefits of earlier generic drug entry and
cheaper generic drugs were easy to describe in tangible terms and were
indisputable, and because American voters lacked meaningful insurance
coverage for prescription drugs, these benefits were compelling.
Although the FDA had supported patent term restoration, addition of
generic drug approval provisions put it in a position to support the broader
bill. The agency generally supported a statutory solution to the generic drug
approval issue. It had struggled for decades to find a lawful pathway to
market for generic drugs, whether those drugs copied pre-1962 products or
post-1962 products. Although the agency had not lost a case in the Supreme
Court within recent memory, it had suffered several bruising defeats in the
lower courts. These included losing to an innovator that had challenged its
decision to allow pre-1962 generic drugs to remain on the market while the
companies prepared ANDAs.466 By 1983, the FDA may have felt it had done
everything it could do to facilitate generic drug access. It was publishing
therapeutic equivalence ratings to assist states with substitution of lower cost
generics.467 It had considered regulatory solutions, such as old drug
monographs and ANDAs through rulemaking, but had abandoned these due
to the specter of another court defeat. It had proposed legislation creating a
monograph system, but this had also failed. Finally, it was now embroiled
in litigation brought by the generic companies to force it to implement
ANDAs through rulemaking—though moving forward would undoubtedly
trigger litigation by the innovators. Indeed, innovators had intervened in the
litigation brought by the generic companies. Arguably there was little to do
but support a statutory ANDA provision. So while the agency had been an
influential voice with respect to enactment of the Kastenmeier bills, the
nuances of the innovative industry’s opposition to the final Hatch-Waxman
legislation related to issues of patent law outside its purview, and the broader
legislation would remove a significant source of stress on the agency.
In addition to the Baptists-and-bootleggers alliance, Representative
Waxman’s support for the generic industry’s policy goals was pivotal.
Professor Sachs, in describing the history of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments, has referred to Waxman as a legislative entrepreneur, which
is clearly correct. Waxman was a member of the House for only four years
and at the start of a long career when the first patent restoration bill was

fibrosis, myasthenia gravis, and emphysema).
466
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Weinberger, 425 F. Supp. 890 (D.D.C. 1975); Conditions
for Marketing Human Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 43,531 (Sept. 22, 1975) (withdrawing
policy in response to court’s order).
467
The agency published the first list in 1980. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (1st ed.
1980).
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introduced—he was in his early 40s during the key years of the debate.468 In
the negotiations leading to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments, Waxman positioned himself as a champion for the public’s
interest in earlier access to less expensive drugs. This was one of his first
pieces of health legislation, and it would bear his name and be viewed as one
of his most significant accomplishments.469 For the remainder of his career,
Waxman would be deeply involved in health legislation and amendments to
the FDCA.
V. CONCLUSION
By reviewing the history of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments from a
public choice perspective, this Article discounts the role of ideas, and
perhaps it should not. The innovators and generic companies sought policy
outcomes that would further their respective financial interests, to be sure,
but policymakers may have seen the policy choices in terms of a deeper
philosophical dispute and may have been, at times, relatively unmoved by
lobbying. The many materials that collectively comprise the history of this
legislation give the impression that the principals, at least, meaning Senator
Hatch, Representative Waxman, and possibly others, were motivated, in
part, by a desire to enact legislation that would solve a difficult problem the
right way by setting the right length of time for innovators to enjoy
exclusivity. This surely played a role in the outcome.
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the alliance between the generic
companies and Public Citizen, and the virtual equating of the generic
industry’s financial interests and the public’s interests, made enactment of
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments possible.
The contextualized history of the legislation thus leads to a conclusion
that differs from conventional assumptions in the scholarship and cases. As
enacted, from a pure before-and-after perspective, the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments imposed a net cost on the innovating drug companies and
conferred a net benefit to the generic drug companies. The innovators
received patent term restoration, but it was neutralized by an experimental
use exception to infringement. They did not receive data exclusivity; they
lost rights to their data after five years. Although the innovators obtained a
statutory stay on generic drug approval during patent litigation, this litigation

468
See Waxman, Henry Arnold, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES: UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/People/Listing/W/WAXMAN,-Henry-Arnold(W000215)/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).
469
E.g., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE MINORITY
STAFF, REP. HENRY A. WAXMAN’S RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS (2014),
https://kaiserhealthnews.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/waxman-record-of-accomplishments2014-1-30.pdf.
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would be happening a handful of years earlier in the lifecycle of their drugs,
thanks to the abbreviated application pathway and experimental use
exception. Not only is it incorrect to state that the scheme benefitted patent
owners, but when the legislation as a whole is examined, the notion that the
generic drug bill advanced more than one private interest should be rejected.
The central claim of this Article—that, because of a Baptist-andbootleggers alliance between generic drug companies and Public Citizen, the
legislation benefitted the generic industry rather than the innovating
industry—is descriptive, not normative. It may, however, have implications
for normative scholarship today.
Over the last thirty years, some stakeholders and policymakers have
been reluctant to discuss reform (let alone replacement) of the HatchWaxman framework because of the conventional wisdom that the
compromise was hard-fought, and the balance between innovators and
generic companies both careful and fragile. In recent years, though, others
have advocated reform—although not a fundamental reassessment—on the
ground that the scheme is too favorable for innovators. Some claim that it
was always pro-patent-owner. Most claim that the scheme has become too
favorable. Under the circumstances, the notion that the Hatch-Waxman
legislation may have harmed the innovating industry should give scholars,
stakeholders, and policymakers pause.
A great deal has happened in the more than thirty years since enactment
of the legislation. The FDA and the courts have interpreted provisions
differently than perhaps was expected—sometimes in ways that favored
innovators, and at other times in ways that favored generic companies.
Regulated companies—both innovators and generic companies—have
naturally found ways to use the enacted law (and the new interpretations) to
their advantage, including in ways that probably no one expected. Criticisms
of the innovators, in particular, focus on perceived attempts to extend
exclusivity in the marketplace. Innovators are accused of “evergreening”
and “product hopping,” using citizen petitions to block generic approval, and
inappropriately refusing to sell products to their competitors for comparative
tests, for instance, all with a view to achieving a longer period of exclusivity
in the market. Thus, many argue, the “balance” in 1984 between innovators
and generic companies has now been “tilted”—by the innovators, if not also
perhaps the courts and agency—in favor of patent owners. A large body of
normative scholarship, working from a historical baseline of balance in
1984, presses policymakers to take steps to rein in the actions of patent
owners, but if the Hatch-Waxman Amendments of 1984 were actually a
policymaking defeat for the innovating industry, this normative work may
be starting from the wrong premise.
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The 1984 legislation created what is now a multi-billion dollar generic
drug industry. Consumers and payers benefit from generic drug pricing on
important medicines every day. But serious normative work on the future of
the Hatch-Waxman framework should start with a clear understanding of
what actually happened in 1984. And it may need to be bolder, that is,
reflecting on the consequences of that defeat, the arguments made then by
the patent owners, and the possibility that the public’s interest would actually
be best served by reforms that shift the landscape in the other direction.

